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The global financial crisis that happened in 2008 shattered people’s trust in the
entire financial services industry. Since then, the financial services industry
remains among the least trusted by consumers despite an improvement in
the economy. The industry has yet to recover the trust from an international
backlash by the public that largely blamed financial institutions for the world’s
economic woes. This also poses an interesting question: what is trust?
Trust is a metric in the life of all individuals. It is a value in relationships, a
cultural phenomenon in modern society, and a critical factor in our decision-
making process. The level of trust we place in a person, an organization or a
system is determined by many complex subsets of factors including our past
experience, expectation, risk propensity, personal background, peer behaviour,
organizational structure and quality attributes. Much research has been di-
rected towards defining trust and determining its application and effects within
modern society. Among all these efforts, quite a lot of research studied the
trust in the information systems we build in day-to-day life and the factors
that affect this trust.
This research initially set the same objective as those efforts, but focused
on the financial services information systems for two reasons. Firstly, finan-
cial services command a high level of trust from customers and so do the
information systems delivering those services. Secondly, the financial services
industry is undergoing a rapid business transformation driven by information
technology, such as on-line banking and high-frequency trading. The initial
research revealed a correlational relationship between the trust and the quality
attributes perceived in such information systems, and developed a prioritised
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list of quality attributes for financial services information systems.
However, the research in this direction has its limitation as the financial ser-
vices information systems were studied as purely technical systems, with little
focus on the interactions with people. As financial services information sys-
tems involve a great amount of interactions with people as well as with other
systems, they are no longer simple or complicated systems, but rather com-
plex systems that are difficult to predict consequently, such systems exhibit
emergent properties. We related previous research to the concept of com-
plex systems, whereby the financial services information systems are studied
as complex systems using the Cynefin framework to understand trust in fi-
nancial services information systems. The framework provides a typology of
contexts that guides what sort of explanations or solutions might apply. It
draws on research into complex adaptive systems theory, cognitive science,
anthropology, and narrative patterns, as well as evolutionary psychology, to
describe problems, situations, and systems. It explores the relationship among
man, experience, and context and proposes new approaches to communication,
decision-making, policy-making, and knowledge management in complex social
environments. However, the framework itself cannot be used as a simple mech-
anism to classify systems and identify formulaic solutions. In simplest terms,
the Cynefin framework shows that all situations are not created equal and
different situations require different responses to successfully navigate them.
The framework not only provides a guideline how to approach a set of dif-
ferent situations, but the characteristics also explain enough to recognize the
different situations. An approach based on the Cynefin framework is proposed
to manage trust in financial services information. The implications of this
research are discussed and the direction of future research considered.
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The financial crisis in 2008 had a significant impact on the levels of trust that
people place in financial institutions. It became a key task for policy-makers
throughout the world to re-establish trust in the financial services industry.
Scientists from all fields agree that a sufficient level of trust plays a crucial part
in the stability and maintenance of social and economic systems. When trust
breaks down, the social system is threatened with unrest and the legitimacy
of the market-based economy is called into question (Gros & Roth, 2010). As
the financial services industry continues its path to recovery, the importance
of trust - or lack thereof - remains front and centre within one of the world’s
most vital sectors. Despite slight improvements in trust levels over the past
several years, the demand for trustworthy business practices and operations
in the industry remains high across the world, and the need to rebuild trust is
increasingly apparent.
The financial service industry is markedly different from what it was two
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decades ago and the rate of change has been rapid in the last few years. Infor-
mation and communication technologies have been the differentiating factors
that have changed the nature of financial services: the ways in which they
are created, delivered, priced, received, and used. Information and communi-
cation technologies are being used to enhance existing services, to implement
new ones, and to make them available in new ways. Financial service orga-
nizations are adopting new technologies to increase their efficiency, provide
satisfaction to their consumers, develop a competitive advantage and reduce
costs.
The latest technological advancements provide a window of opportunity for
financial institutions to improve business performance and gain a competitive
advantage. The integration of data and technology to help customers manage
their money in a better and quicker way, and the use of newer channels such
as mobile devices and social media help deliver banking services as and when
customers need them. Continuing advances in technology allow the financial
services industry to deploy solutions that are increasingly complex to help
clients make more informed investment decisions. Innovations such as cloud
computing will help bring a host of benefits to clients from automation and
capacity on demand, to accelerate time to marketing real time data infras-
tructure and strengthen client service. The use of technology like portal and
content management tools help in improving efficiency, reducing call centre
traffic, knowledge sharing and incorporate enterprise social networks. Mobile
banking, for example, has become a regular delivery channel and customer
touch point for banking services. Forrester, a global research and advisory
firm, predicts that the total number of U.S. adults who use mobile banking
will increase from 10 million to a whopping 50 million by 2015. This growth
will see a shift in mobile banking adoption percentages to a new high, and make
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the channel a top priority for banks as they continue to add more functionality
and newer features in their mobile banking solutions. Mobile payments have
taken off in the last few years, and are now poised to grow from $450 billion
in 2015 to $620 billion worldwide in 2016.
There is now overwhelming evidence that financial services organizations have
recognized the importance of information and communication technologies to
the industry and are considering information and communication technologies
not only as a supporting function, but as a core competency. To grab the best
programming talent, banks are paying top dollar for the best and brightest
coders and developers. In April 2014, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase
& Co., told the firm’s shareholders in his annual letter that the firm employs
nearly 30,000 programmers, application developers and information technology
employees who keep 7,200 applications, 32 data centres, 58,000 servers, 300,000
desktops and global network operating smoothly for all their clients.
As the information and communication technologies have become the core
competence of the financial services industry, it is therefore important for
the financial services information systems to demonstrate the trustworthiness
that the customers expect to see in the financial services industry. In addition,
information systems are usually the first contact point for the customers to
transact business with the financial services organizations, and their ability
to gain trust from customers impacts the customer’s overall trust towards the
financial service organization.
1.1.1 Problem Under Investigation
How to manage the trust in financial services information systems is the prob-
lem under investigation in this research. Before we proceed further, we need to
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first clarify the concepts of information systems, financial services information
systems and the type of trust that is being investigated.
’Financial services’ is a generic term used to refer to the services provided by
the financial institutions that deal with the management of money. Some of
the prominent examples of financial institutions include banks, insurance com-
panies, credit card companies and stock brokerage firms. Financial services are
not limited to the field of deposits and investment services but are also present
in the fields of real estate, insurance, securities, and all forms of financial or
market intermediation including the distribution of financial products.
Information systems are systems composed of the people and computers that
process or interpret information. They are part of the information and commu-
nication technology that an organization uses, and also the way in which the
people interact with this technology in support of business processes. There
are various types of information systems, for example, transaction processing
systems, decision support systems, knowledge management systems, learning
management systems, database management systems and office information
systems. Critical to most information systems are information technologies,
which are typically designed to enable human beings to perform tasks for which
the human brain is not well suited, such as: handling large amounts of infor-
mation, performing complex calculations and controlling many simultaneous
processes.
In this research, financial services information systems refer to information
systems used by a broad range of financial services organizations that provide
financial services (Chan & Ying, 2010a). These information systems facili-
tate the flow of information between different parties engaged in a financial
relationship, and which has the potential to cause a flow of money between
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parties. These organizations include banks, credit card companies, insurance
companies, consumer finance companies, stock brokerages, investment funds,
and some government sponsored regulatory enterprises. The financial services
information systems that are employed deal with the management of money to
provide services that include banking, foreign exchange, investment, and insur-
ances, and so on. Typical examples of financial services information systems
are the network of Automated Teller Machines (ATM), on-line retailer broker-
age systems, foreign exchange trading systems, risk management systems in
the banks, and so on.
Due to the complexity of many of the financial services provided by the compa-
nies and the information systems that support them, trust plays a significant
role in the development and maintenance of successful relationships in the
financial services sector. This research focuses on the trust relationship be-
tween the financial services information systems and the users as they engage
in the business activities that these systems are built to perform. The users
of the financial services information systems come from various organizations
and backgrounds, and perform various functions within this nexus of linked
interests. For example, a person could be a retailer investor who performs
transactions on the foreign exchange trading system, a housewife who trans-
fers money on the bank’s Internet banking portal, a tourist who withdraws the
money on oversea trips using his credit cards, or an internal user in the bank
who uses the information systems to perform risk management functions.
5
1.1.2 Importance of Trust in Financial Services Infor-
mation Systems
Trust is an important factor in every aspect of human social life. It is the foun-
dation for human beings to establish a meaningful relationship that enables
cooperation. In the literature (and often in everyday normal conversations) it
is now commonplace to find the slogan that says that trust is the glue of society
and it is crucial and vital in economics, in social cooperation, in organization
and so on. The real reason that trust plays such an essential role in human
social life in every dimension is not (simply) the need for reducing uncertainty,
and for feeling and acting in a more confident way. All those reasons are true,
but not sufficient to understand this phenomenon and all its implications. For
us, the most fundamental reason is that human beings are social in a basic
and objective sense, and they depend very much on each other. Hence, the
existence of the trust element enables the formation of such dependencies.
Trust in information systems is as important as trust in human beings because
people today rely as much on the information systems as they do on one an-
other. For example, in hospitals, doctors rely on the medical record retrieval
system to check on the patient’s previous medical conditions. When customers
make an on-line purchase from Taobao, they rely on an order-tracking system
to tell them whether the package has arrived. When you deal with cash trans-
actions at a bank ATM, you rely on the system to both track your transactions
accurately and prevent others from accessing either your money or your ac-
count information.
Trust is a crucial factor for the financial services information systems. Fi-
nancial services information systems possess three significant properties which
create challenges to the management of the relationship and make trust even
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more vital than other information systems.
Firstly, financial services information systems operate in an environment where
both trust and distrust can coexist simultaneously. Distrust is not simply the
converse of trust; rather, it is seen as a separate and independent construct
(McAllister, 1995). Trust is usually developed through a long-term process
while distrust may be the consequence of a single action such as a hurtful
conversation, an unintended incident, or unfortunate action, and so forth. On
the one hand, end users place a high level of trust in the financial services
information systems and believe that they will deliver the expected result and
outcome. The high level of trust is deeply rooted in the experience they have
gained about the system and reputation of the organizations sponsoring such fi-
nancial services information systems. Compared to other information systems,
financial services information systems typically have higher requirements on
their performance and reliability due to the nature of the business they are in.
Without such a high level of trust, individuals would not deposit money into
ATMs, and retailer investors would rather not conduct their trading of stocks
and currencies on-line. On the other hand, users have an equally healthy level
of distrust of these systems due to the high level of risk involved. To protect
themselves, they expect to have validation and verification to confirm every
single transaction - the distrust may be seen as a wise precaution in the face
of such risks. This creates a challenge for it is not sufficient to focus only
on building the trust relationship; in fact, it is equally important to remove
distrust in the environment and rehabilitate the trust relationship in the face
of untoward incidents.
Secondly, the financial services information systems are changing and they
are evolving at a very fast pace, driven by the financial innovation and rapid
technology development over the last few decades. Broadly speaking, financial
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innovation is the act of creating and then popularizing new financial instru-
ments as well as new financial technologies, institutions and markets. Finan-
cial markets have produced a multitude of new products, including many new
forms of derivatives, alternative risk transfer products, exchange traded funds,
and variants of tax-deductible equity (Tufano, 2002). The deregulation of the
banking industry since the 1980s has increased the free flow of capital in the
US domestic market and facilitated a process of complicated financial inno-
vations to create new financial products. The information systems, on which
these new financial services and products are delivered, are also changing and
evolving constantly to catch up with these innovations in financial services.
Some types of financial innovation are also driven by improvements in com-
puter and telecommunication technology. For example, Internet banking now
allows customers to conduct financial transactions on a secure website oper-
ated by their retail or virtual bank, credit union or building society - something
which is only possible with the rapid development of the Internet and secu-
rity technology such as 2-factor authentication and the security token device.
With all the changes in financial services and information technologies, finan-
cial services information systems undergo rapid evolution. This creates the
second challenge in that it is not sufficient to look at the trust relationship as
a static property of the system; rather, it is also important to keep developing
the trust relationship as the system evolves.
Lastly, more and more financial services information systems are becoming
complex systems and exhibiting unpredictable behaviour at times. Rzevski
and Skobelev (2007) provided a set of criteria for complex systems, which
describes the unique characteristics of complex systems and their article in-
cludes the information systems in financial services as complex systems as
well. Financial services information systems often consist of a large number
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of components which are operated and managed independently, by separate
companies, departments or teams. These information systems evolve quickly,
driven by financial innovation and technology advancement. The collection
of the financial services information systems present emergent properties as it
performs operations that cannot be localized to component systems. As such,
users find it difficult to predict behaviours of the financial services information
systems as it is too complex and they turn to trust as a means of reducing the
complexity so that they can make a decision.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research is about managing trust in financial services information systems
and aims to address two objectives. The first objective is to understand how
trust works in the financial services information systems. A literature review
of the general concept of trust is undertaken to show the multi-faceted nature
of the concept of trust. Various definitions of trust from different academic
disciplines are closely examined and the conceptual core with the common deep
meaning is extracted, beyond the various specific uses and limited definitions.
First, the confusion between trust, trustworthiness and trust propensity is
clarified. Then the difference between the degree of trust and the decision
to trust is studied, followed by an analysis of the trust source. The negative
side of trust, which includes mistrust, distrust, lack of trust and doubt, is also
discussed in detail to gain a full understanding of the concept of trust. Finally,
the trust dynamics are illustrated to demonstrate the dynamic and complex
nature of the trust phenomenon.
The second objective is to develop a framework to manage trust in financial
9
services information system efficiently and effectively. We start with man-
aging the trustworthiness of the financial services information systems. Sev-
eral surveys, interviews and experiments are conducted to validate the initial
framework. Along the way of the research, it becomes evident to conclude that
financial services information systems are complex systems and managing trust
in this domain requires a complex systems approach. The traditional approach
that focuses on building the trustworthiness of the systems are proven to be
ineffective and inefficient. A new framework that originates from the Cynefin
framework is developed and proposed to manage trust in financial services
information systems effectively and efficiently.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This research develops a comprehensive multi-layered theoretical framework
to manage trust in financial services information systems, which consists of
technical, social and environmental perspectives. The theoretical framework
is summarized in the figure below.
The technical perspective looks at the trustworthiness of financial services in-
formation systems and manages the trust by building the quality attributes,
such as usability, functionality, reliability, availability, performance and secu-
rity, of the systems. All those quality attributes contribute to the trustworthi-
ness of the systems and they have a strong correlational relationship with the
users’ trust. However, the technical perspective alone does not explain well
why different people often have different levels of trust in the same system.
The social perspective looks at the financial services information systems using
a sociological trust model, which defines the users’ trust in the systems as the
10
Figure 1-1: Theoretical framework of the research
users’ expectation generalized from past experience, against the stake at risk
and the perceived complexity of the systems. As the model suggests, trust can
be improved by the following means: 1) raise the expectation by delivering
the experience that meets and exceeds the expectation; 2) reduce the risk
exposure; and 3) reduce the perceived complexity. The social perspective,
together with the technical perspective, provides a better understanding of
how trust works in financial services information systems and how it can be
better managed. Surprisingly, it is not uncommon to find that some of the
carefully engineered financial services information systems by good system
developers and architects do not exhibit the trustworthiness that the designs
intend to achieve and thus damage the users’ trust. This phenomenon could
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not easily be explained from both technical and social perspectives. This
observation leads us to a more complex systems perspective.
The environmental perspective looks at the financial services information sys-
tems using the Cynefin framework, which categorizes ’systems’ into four envi-
ronmental domains: simple, complicated, complex and chaotic. The trust for
the financial services information systems in each domain needs to be managed
using different responses based on the environmental domain it is in.
1.4 Significance of the research
This research represents an initial attempt to empirically study the trust re-
lationship in financial services information systems. The significance of this
research is multi-dimensional in that it suggests a number of immediate out-
comes for applications and future research.
Firstly, this research attempts to understand trust within the context of in-
formation systems in financial services industry. Within this framework, a
topology of trust and a trust development model is offered, and testable as-
sumptions about the relationships between trust and quality attributes of fi-
nancial services information systems are proposed.
Secondly, this research looks at the financial services information systems as
complex systems and the trust as a complex phenomenon that requires a to-
tally different approach to manage. A different approach based on the Cynefin
framework is proposed to improve the trust in financial services information
systems effectively and efficiently.
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research
and provides an overview of the entire thesis. Section 1.1 includes a discussion
of the research background to explain why an investigation into trust in finan-
cial services information systems is important and defines the problem under
investigation. In Section 1.2, the research objectives are set out in detail. The
significance of this research is presented in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 introduces
the structure of this thesis and provides a short summary of each chapter of
the thesis.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is relevant to a study of trust in financial
services information systems. Section 2.1 discusses the trust definitions across
the different disciplines. Section 2.2 covers a few trust-related issues, such as
the degree of trust and decision to trust, the trust sources, the negative side
of trust as well as the trust dynamic in order to fully understand the trust
issue. Section 2.3 focuses on the literature of trust in technology and system
domain. Section 2.4 discusses the function of trust and explains how trust
works in decision-making process and other social aspects.
Chapter 3 studies the trust in information systems of financial services from
the technical perspective. Section 3.1 proposes a trust topology based on
experience, reputation and communication. In Section 3.2, the relationship
between trust and the quality attributes of the information systems are pre-
sented. Section 3.3 discusses the approaches to manage the trust in financial
services information systems, which look at the financial services information
systems as non-complex systems.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from the technical perspective to the social per-
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spective. It studies the financial services information systems as engineering
systems, which are systems designed by humans having some purpose and are
composed of interacting components.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the study from the complex systems perspec-
tive. Section 5.1 explains the transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, shifting
the research focus to complex systems approach. Section 5.2 described the
research design in detail. Section 5.3 presents the results and findings of the
research from the complex systems approach. Section 5.4 discusses the impli-
cations of the research.
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion of the research, which includes the interpre-
tations derived from the results of the current research, the implications for
scholars and practitioners and directions for future research. Suggestions are
made on how the results can be applied to other contexts involving the need
for trust in engineering systems. In addition, the limitations of the study are




As this entire research is about trust in financial services information systems,
one fundamental concern is to clarify the concept of trust, especially under-
standing the differences among the many ways in which the term is applied
in general and in different disciplines. Even though there is no universally ac-
cepted definition and understanding of the concept of trust, a literature review
of trust from different disciplines (each of which defines and explains trust, but
from very different perspectives) provides a helpful illustration of some of the
more common ways trust is perceived in common usage, including trust in so-
ciology, trust in psychology, trust in organization theory, and trust in systems
and technology.
Trust means different things in different contexts, but they are systematically
related to each other. In particular, three crucial concepts have been recog-
nized and distinguished in the scientific literature. Trust is:
• A mere mental attitude (prediction and evaluation) towards another
agent. This mental attitude is in fact an opinion, a judgement, an
evaluation about specific and relevant ”virtues” needed for relying on
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the potential trustee, but that might remain separated from the actual
exercise of trust.
• A decision to rely upon another person, i.e. an intention to delegate and
trust, which makes the trustor ”vulnerable” (Mayer et al., 1995). This
is again a mental attitude, but it is the result of a complex comparison
and match among the preventive evaluations of the different potential
trustees, about the risks and the costs, and about the applicability of
these evaluations to the actual environments and context.
• A behaviour of trust, i.e. the intentional act of (en)trusting, and the
consequent overt and practical relationship between the trustor and the
trustee. This is the consequent act(behaviour) of the trustors, gener-
ally coordinated and coherent with the previous decision, the public
announcement and the social relation.
Trust is in general all these things combined together. In order to understand
this concept and its real meaning, we have to analyse it and show the complex
relations that exist among different terms and constituents.
2.1 Definitions of Trust
In this section, we will conduct a thorough review of the predominant defini-
tions of trust in the literature, which will show that there is not yet clear and
convincing definition, which is commonly shared and accepted by scholars from
various disciplines. Despite the fact that there is not a universally accepted
definition of trust, and the use of the term trust and its analytical definition
are confused and often inaccurate, a common thread of meaning and a con-
ceptual core can be seen in its various specific uses. Most researchers working
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on trust provide their own definitions, which tend to be limited to specific do-
mains. When all these definitions specific to its own domain are put together,
they provide a descriptive definition of trust with a common core.
We will start with a content analysis of a large number of definitions to identify
the most recurrent and important features in trust definitions, then describe
them and subsequently explain their hidden connections and gaps. In this
analysis, we will take as initial inspiration Castaldo’s content analysis of trust
definitions (Castaldo, 2002). After that, we will consider some specific defi-
nitions from different disciplines in order to show how divergent and domain-
specific they are. Those definitions will be presented in a simplistic manner,
without fully discussing the analysis or theory of the author.
2.1.1 A Content Analysis
In dealing with the current ”theoretical negligence” and conceptual confusion
in trust definitions, Castaldo (2002) applied a more descriptive and empirical
approach. Castaldo performed a content analysis of 72 definitions of trust (818
terms; 273 different terms), as employed in the following domains: Manage-
ment (46%), Marketing (24%), Psychology (18%), and Sociology (12%). The
survey covered the period from the 1960s to the 1990s, as described in Table
2.1 (This table is from Castaldo. For more sophisticated data and comments







Table 2.1: Number of trust definitions in different periods
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This analysis is indeed quite useful, since it immediately reveals the degree of
confusion and ambiguity that plagues current definitions of trust. Moreover, it
also provides a concrete framework to identify empirically different ”families”
of definitions, important conceptual nucleuses, necessary components and re-
curring terms. Thus, we will use these precious results as the first basis for
comparison and a source of inspiration, and only later on will we discuss in
detail the specific definitions and models of trust.
Castaldo summarizes the results of his analysis, underlining how the trust
definitions are based on five inter-related categories. They are:
• The construct, where trust is conceived ”as an expectation, a belief,
willingness, and an attitude” (Castaldo, 2002).
• The trustee, ”usually individuals, groups, firms, organizations, sellers,
and so on” (Castaldo, 2002). Given the different nature of the trustee
(individuals, organizations, and social institutions), there are different
types of trust (personal, inter-organizational and institutional). These
trustees ”are often described by referencing the different characteristics
in the definitions being analysed, such as specific competencies, capac-
ities, non-opportunistic motivations, personal values, the propensity to
trust others, and so on” (Castaldo, 2002).
• Actions and behaviours, which are described by other authors (e.g. (Moor-
man et al., 1992)) the behavioural aspect of trust is fundamental for
”recognizing the concept of trust itself” (Castaldo, 2002); both trustor
and trustee behaviours have to take into account the consistency of the
trust relationship. The behavioural aspects of trust have been studied to
show its multi-dimensional nature (e.g. (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996)).
• Results and outputs of behaviour, the trustee’s actions are presumed to
be both predictable and positive for the trustor. The predictability of
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the other person’s behaviour and the fact that the behaviour produces
outcomes that are favourable to the trustor’s objectives, are the two
typical results of trust. This has been particularly studied in works
which suggest that models are designed to identify the consequences of
trust (e.g. (Busacca & Castaldo, 2002)).
• The risk, without uncertainty and risk there is no trust. The trustor
has to believe this. They have to willingly put themselves into a ”posi-
tion of vulnerability with regard to the trustee”. Risk, uncertainty and
ambiguity (e.g. (Johannisson, 2001)) are the fundamental analytic pre-
suppositions of trust, or rather the elements that describe the situations
where trust has some importance for predictive purposes.
The following observations are made by Castelfranchi (2010) when he analysed
the result (see Table 2.2) of the content analysis conducted by Castaldo:
• As for the terms Will, Expect, Belief, Outcome, Attitude, they
refer to the future (as Castaldo emphasizes), thus it is also included in
the notion of expectation, which in turn involves a specific kind of belief:
in its minimal sense, an expectation is indeed a belief about the future
(Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2002; Castelfranchi & Lorini, 2003). Moreover,
the term belief implies a mental attitude, and we can say that trust as
evaluation and expectation is an attitude towards the trustee and his
action: the outcome, the events, the situation, the environment.
• As for the terms Action and Decision, they refer to trust as the de-
ciding process of X’s and subsequently Y’s course of action; hence they
are general, but only with reference to the richer meaning of trust that
trust is a decision and an intention.
• As for the terms Expect, Outcome, Rely, Positive, Exploit, and
Fulfill, they refer to the fact that the positive outcome of the trustee’s
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action is expected, relied upon, and exploited to fulfill the trustor’ ob-
jective. In short: X has a goal (a desire or need) that is expected to be
fulfilled thanks to Y’s act; X intends to exploit the positive outcome of
Y’s act, and relies upon Y for fulfilling the goal.
• As for the terms Taken, Accept, Risk, and Vulnerable, it means
that when deciding to count on Y, to trust Y (according to trust as
decision), X is necessarily accepting the risk of becoming vulnerable to
action by Y, since there is uncertainty both in X’s knowledge (incom-
plete, wrong, static) and in the (unpredictable, unknown) dynamics of
the world. Whenever deciding to depend on Y for achieving outcome O,
X is exposed both to failure (not fulfilling O) and to additional harms,
since there are intrinsic costs in the act of reliance, as well as retreats
to possible alternatives, potential damages inflicted by Y while X is not
defended, and so on. As we will discuss more thoroughly in the next
sections, all these risks are direct consequences of X’s decision to trust
Y.
• As for the terms Competence and Willingness, they identify the two
basic prototypical features of ”active” trust in Y, i.e. the two necessary
components of the positive evaluation of Y that qualify trust: a) The
belief of X (evaluation and expectation) that Y is competent (able, in-
formed, expert, skilled) for effectively doing α and producing O; b)The
belief of X (evaluation and expectation) that Y is willing to do α, intends
and is committed to do α, notice that this is precisely what makes an
agent Y predictable and reliable for X.
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Terms Frequency
Subject (Actor, Agent, Another, Company, Customer,
Firm, Group, Individual, It, One, Other, Party, People,
Person, Salesperson, Somebody, Trustee, Trustor)
180
Action (Action, Act, Behavior, Behave, Behavioral) 42
Will 29
Expect, Expectation, Expected, Expectancy 24
Belief, Believe 23
Outcome, Result, Performance, Perform 19
Rely, Reliable, Reliance, Relied, Reliability, Relying 18
Trust, Trusting, Trustworthy 17
Confident, Confidence 16
Willingness, Willing 14
Take, Taken, Taking, Accept, Accepted, Acceptable 11





Competent, Competence, Capabilities 7
Positive 7





Fulfill, Fulfilled, Fulfillment 5
Intention, Intentionally, Intend 5
Involve, Involved, Involvement, Involving 5
Table 2.2: Most frequently used terms in trust definitions
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2.1.2 Predominant Trust Definitions
One of the earliest and most popular definitions of trust is the one coined
by Deutsch (1962) which states that: (a) an individual is confronted with an
ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an event perceived to be beneficial
or to an event perceived to be harmful; (b) he perceives that the occurrence
of these events is contingent on the behaviour of another person; and (c) he
perceives the strength of a harmful event to be greater than the strength of a
beneficial event. If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties,
he makes a trusting choice; else he makes a distrustful choice. He further
refined his definition of trust as - confidence that an individual will find what
is desired from another, rather than what is feared (Deutsch, 1973). Both his
definitions imply that trust is subjective and dependent on the views of the
individual.
Deutsch also said that a distrusting choice is avoiding an ambiguous path
that has greater possible negative consequences than positive consequences, a
definition that is the opposite of his definition of trust. Previously, Deutsch
used the term ”suspicion” for distrust. By using either term,it is clear that
Deutsch felt that distrust and trust were opposites.
Niklas Luhmann (1979) approaches trust sociologically and considers trust as
a means for reducing the complexity of society, where complexity is created
by interacting individuals with different perceptions and goals. In this defini-
tion, trust acts as a tool to reduce the social complexity. Without trust, all
contingent possibilities should always be considered, leading to a paralysis of
inaction. Trust can be seen as a bet on one of the contingent futures, the one
that may deliver benefits. Once the bet is decided (i.e. trust is granted), the
trustor suspends his or her disbelief, and the possibility of a negative course
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of action is not considered at all. Because of it, trust acts as a reductor of
social complexity, allowing for actions that are otherwise too complex to be
considered (or even impossible to consider at all).
Bernard Barber (1983) offers a concise general definition of trust as ”expec-
tation of the persistence and fulfilment of the natural and the moral social
orders”. Beyond this overarching statement, Barber offers two additional def-
initions that have more explicatory value in social relationships: first, ”trust
as the expectation of technically competent role performance,” and second,
”the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral obli-
gations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for the other’s
interests above their own”.
Another popular definition of trust that has also been adopted by computer
scientists is the one coined by Diego Gambetta (1988). He defines trust as a
particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before
he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able
to monitor it) and in a context which it affects his own action. This definition
stresses that trust is basically an estimation, an opinion, an expectation, i.e.
a belief. Gambetta introduced the concept of using values for trust.
There is another important and recent definition of trust in Sociology, in which
trust denotes a behaviour based on an expectation, but both the behaviour and
the expectation are defined in a very restricted way. Elinor Ostrom and James
Walker defined trust in their book titled ”Trust and Reciprocity” (Ostrom
& Walker, 2003) as ”the willingness to take some risk in relation to other
individuals on the expectation that the other will reciprocate”.
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman approach trust from the perspective of organi-
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zation theory and define trust as ”willingness to be vulnerable to the actions
of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a par-
ticular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor
or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995).
In psychology, trust is the belief that another person or group of people will
do what is expected and this was formed fairly early in life, starting with
the family. Psychologist Erikson (1950) believes that trust begins in infancy,
when children learn that they can trust their parents to take care of their
needs when they cry. Trust is integral to the idea of social influence: it is
easier to influence or persuade someone who is trusting. The notion of trust
is increasingly adopted to predict acceptance of behaviours by others, insti-
tutions and objects such as machines. Colquitt et al. (2007) distinguished
trustworthiness and trust propensity from trust. Trust is being vulnerable to
someone even when they are trustworthy; trustworthiness is the characteristics
or behaviours of a person that inspire positive expectations in another person,
and trust propensity is the quality of being able to rely on others. Once trust
is lost, by obvious violation of one of these three determinants, it is very hard
to regain. Thus, there is clear asymmetry in the building versus destruction
of trust. Hence, being trustworthy and acting in a trustworthy manner should
be considered the only sure way to maintain a level of trust.
Philosophers such as Annette Baier (1986) made a distinction between trust
and reliance by saying that trust can be betrayed, whilst reliance can only be
disappointed. A good example to explain Baier’s argument is given by Carolyn
McLeod (2011) as follows: ”we can rely on our clock to give the time, but we
do not feel betrayed when it breaks, thus, we cannot say that we trusted it;
we are not trusting when we are suspicious of the other person, because this
is in fact an expression of distrust”. Thus, trust is different from reliance in
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the sense that a trustor accepts the risk of betrayal. Therefore, risk is actually
eliminated in the perception of the trustor in the sense that the definition does
not include whether the expectation or belief is favourable or unfavourable. For
example, to have an expectation of a friend arriving for dinner late because she
has habitually arrived late for the last fifteen years, is a confident expectation
(whether or not we agree with her annoying late arrivals). The trust is not
about what we wish for, rather it is in the consistency of the data of our
habits. As a result, there is no risk of betrayal because the data now exists as
collective knowledge.
Castelfranchi (2010) proposed a socio-cognitive model of trust in a 5-part re-
lation as follows: Trustor X trusts (in) trustee Y in context C for performing
action α (executing task τ) and realizing the result p (that includes or corre-
sponds to trustor’s goal gX). This model has a relational construct between:
• A trustor X, who is necessarily an ”intentional entity” with mental in-
gredients (beliefs, goals, intentions, and so on). Trust must (also) be
extended in cognitive terms, as X’s specific mental attitudes towards
other agents and about given tasks.
• A trustee Y, who is also an ”intentional agent” able to cause some effect
(outcome) in the world that X is waiting for.
• Such a ”causal” process (the act, or performance) and its result; that
is, an act α of Y possibly producing the outcome p; which is positive or
desirable because it includes (or corresponds to) the content of a goal of
X (gX), the specific goal for which X is trusting Y. We call this act: Y’s
task: τ . τ is the couple (α, p), with gX included in p or in some cases
p≡gX.
• A context (C) or situation or environment where X takes into account
Y (thus affecting X’s evaluation and choice of Y) and/or where Y is
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supposed to act and to realize the task (thus affecting the possibility of
success).
Castelfranchi’s socio-cognitive model limits the trustee to be an intentional
entity, which does not fit our research context, as financial services information
systems are not intentional entities, the model considers and analyzes trust as a
composed and ”layered” notion, where the various meanings are put together.
Thus, this research will make reference to this model loosely as a tool to
understand the trust concept in the financial services information systems.
2.2 Understanding Trust
Trust is a complex notion, with various components and dimensions and a
multi-role relation.
There is attention to the topic of trust from different disciplines. Trust is
seen by many sociologists as a three part relationship: ”A trusts B to do X,
or with respect to X” (Baier, 1986; Luhmann, 1979; Hardin, 2002). In this
definition there is the trustor(X), who is willing to place confidence, reliability
or its own vulnerability, in the hands of others - the trustee(Y), who can fulfil
his or her role as well as betray the trustor, and the object or result towards
which trust is directed (gX). For example, ”I (trustor) trust the bus-driver
(trustee) to send me to the workplace on time (the object of trust)” or ”The
parents (trustor) trust the teachers (trustee) to take care of their children (the
object of trust)” or ”The citizens (trustor) trust the government (trustee) not
to abuse their power”.
Of course not all trust relationships are considered equal. Referring to the
three examples above, Sztompka (1999) distinguishes between ”responsive”,
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”anticipatory” and ”evocative” trust. There is no need to enter the problem
of the various forms of trust, but for our goal it is important to keep in mind
the three part relationship of trust, with particular emphasis on the relation
between the trustor and the trustee. This tells us that a trust relation involves
mutual commitments (Deutsch, 1958; Sztompka, 1999; Jalava, 2003), - a close
inter-relation - between the trustor and the trustee.
In this section we will continue to review the various issues with regards to
the trust relationship in the literature to gain a fuller understanding of the
concept.
2.2.1 Trust, Trustworthiness and Trust Propensity
While the multidisciplinary inquiry into the trust concept has created a breadth
of ideas and contributed to published literature on the subject, it has also
created confusion about the definition and conceptualization of the trust con-
struct. Some scholars view trust as a behavioral intention (Mayer et al., 1995;
McKnight et al., 1998)) or an internal action, similar to choosing, judging,
or preferring (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Riker, 1971). Others view trust as
synonymous with trustworthiness, discussing trust in the context of personal
characteristics that inspire positive expectations on the part of other individ-
uals (e.g. (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; McKnight et al., 1998)). Still others view
trust as a facet of personality that develops early in life and remains relatively
stable through adulthood (Rotter, 1967; Webb & Worchel, 1986)).
Many discussions of trust conflate trust and trustworthiness together, with
claims about trust that might well apply to trustworthiness but that seem
off the mark for trust. Mayer et al.’s integrative model separated trust from
trustworthiness, with three characteristics of the trustee (ability, benevolence,
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and integrity) appearing as antecedents of trust. This structure, which has
been adopted in subsequent models (Mayer et al., 1995; Ross & LaCroix,
1996; Williams, 2001) echoes Gabarro’s (1978) suggestion that trustworthiness
is a multifaceted construct that captures the competence and character of the
trustee (see also (Butler, 1991; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Kee & Knox, 1970)). In
addition, Mayer et al. (1995) drew a distinction between trust as a situational
state and trust as a personality variable, with trust propensity defined as a
stable individual difference that affects the likelihood that a person will trust
(see also (Rotter, 1967; Stack, 1978)).
Trustworthiness
The definitions of trust offered by Mayer et al. (1995) include an expecta-
tion that another party will perform a particular action. One driver of that
expectation is trustworthiness, as Lewis and Weigert (1985) noted:
”First, trust is based on a cognitive process which discriminates among persons
and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown. In this sense,
we cognitively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under which
circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be ”good reasons”,
constituting evidence of trustworthiness. (p. 970)”
In the words of Flores and Solomon (1998), ”In the ideal case, one trusts some-
one because she is trustworthy, and one’s trustworthiness inspires trust” (p.
209). Clearly, then, the concept of trustworthiness is central to understanding
and predicting trust levels. Gabarro (1978) conducted a longitudinal study
of how managers develop working relationships with their subordinates. He
conducted interviews with newly appointed managers over a 3-year period,
focusing specifically on the ”bases of trust” (p. 295).
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One of those bases was competence or ability, which captures the knowledge
and skills needed to do a specific job along with the interpersonal skills and
general wisdom needed to succeed in an organization (Gabarro, 1978). Ability
has become one of the more commonly discussed components of trustworthi-
ness (Barber, 1983; Butler, 1991; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Gabarro, 1978; Kee
& Knox, 1970; Mayer et al., 1995). Another of those bases was character,
a multifaceted construct that subsumes concepts like honesty, fairness, open-
ness, caring motive and intentions, and predictability. Mayer et al.’s model
separates character into two components. The first component is benevolence,
defined as the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good for the
trustor, apart from any profit motive, with synonyms including loyalty, open-
ness, caring, or supportiveness (Mayer et al., 1995). The second component
is integrity, defined as the extent to which a trustee is believed to adhere to
sound moral and ethical principles, with synonyms including fairness, justice,
consistency, and promising fulfilment.
Trust Propensity
Trust is a generalized expectancy to attribute benevolent intent to others and
rely on information received from others about uncertain environmental states
and their outcomes in a situation involving risk (Rotter, 1971)). Trust propen-
sity is a stable individual difference (Rotter, 1980) that represents an indi-
vidual’s dispositional tendency to trust or distrust (be suspicious of) other
individuals. People differ in this trait; some are always distrustful of others,
whereas others believe that people can be trusted. According to Rotter, an
individual’s general orientation regarding trust is especially salient in novel
or ambiguous situations where individuals cannot predict the behaviour of
others. Those who characteristically trust others, even under conditions of
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uncertainty, believe that they will be treated fairly and that over time their
good acts will be reciprocated in some manner (Smith et al., 1983). Thus, they
get involved in organizations and derive a positive self-concept from positive
experiences as organizational members. Disposition to trust is a general, i.e.
not situation-specific, inclination to display faith in humanity and to adopt
a trusting stance toward others (Mayer et al., 1995; McKnight et al., 1998),
and is perceived as a personality trait (Grabner-Kruter & Kaluscha, 2003).
This tendency is not based upon experience with or knowledge of a specific
trusted party, but is the result of an ongoing lifelong experience and social-
ization. As an antecedent of trust, trust propensity is most effective in initial
phases of a relationship when the parties are still mostly unfamiliar with each
other (Mayer et al., 1995) and before extensive ongoing relationships provide
a necessary background for the formation of other trust-building beliefs, such
as integrity, benevolence and ability.
This personality-based facet of trust has been referred to by other scholars as
dispositional trust (Kramer, 1999), or generalized trust (Stack, 1978). McK-
night et al. (1998) argued that trust propensity has taken on a new importance
as cross-functional teams, structural reorganizations, and joint ventures cre-
ate new working relationships more frequently. After all, trust propensity is
likely to be the most relevant trust antecedent in contexts involving unfamiliar
actors (Bigley & Pearce, 1998).
2.2.2 Degree of Trust and Decision to Trust
The trust definitions we have reviewed so far analyse trust from the qualitative
point of view. They identify the constituents of trust and the process to build
trust. To further understand the trust concept, we have to adopt a quantitative
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approach as well. We have to describe, evaluate and measure the quantitative
nature of the trust. When the trustor decides to trust the trustee, he has to
consider the different constituents of trust, like competence, intention, context,
and so on. At the same time, the trustor also has to evaluate their amount:
whether the weight of each constituent is enough, whether the quantity of
their aggregate composition (also considering overlapping, interferences and
contradicting) can be evaluated as sufficient for trusting the trustee. Every day
we hear conversations like: ”Ivy is really a trustworthy manager” or ”Bryan is
very reliable and can be trusted”, where quantitative evaluations are expressed
in an approximate way, such as ”really” and ”very”. It suggests that there
is a degree of trust to be considered in the decision-making process. And we
always test these quantifications against the specific task or situation: ”How
much do you trust him for this project?” or ”Are you sure he can be trusted
for this task in this difficult time?” and so on. So although the qualitative
analysis of the trust constituents is fundamental for getting the real sense of
the trust concept, their quantification and an adequate composition will enable
the results of its application to be effectively evaluated and simulated.
The idea that trust is a quantitative concept and is measurable is well-accepted
by the majority of studies on trust. However, there is no universal formula
to measure the amount of trust accepted by all studies so far, probably due
to the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of trust in the first
place. The quantification of trust is therefore quite ad hoc and arbitrary. In
our study, we have attempted to measure trust by various means, such as ag-
gregate opinion of the trustors towards the trustee, or deriving the trust based
on the amount of constituents. However, these methods of measurement, just
like other efforts to quantify the trust by scholars from different academic
disciplines, work well only for a specific field and for a specific situation. Nev-
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ertheless, these two means of measurement reflect two common approaches to
measure the trust, but from two different aspects. On one hand, the degree of
trust is derived from the degree of the ”constituents” of the trustee (trustwor-
thiness), in which the positive expectation is based while on the other hand,
it is a subjective certainty of the belief.
The first approach describes the quantitative level of the trustee’s quality
(trustworthiness): for example, does the mobile banking application have the
quality (reliability, availability, performance and so on) to make the fund trans-
fer? These values could be either directly numerical (99.999% availability by
design) or described by linguistic categories referring to a set of numerical at-
tributions (”very fast”). The second approach describes the quantitative level
of the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s quality (perceived trustworthiness):
for example, do you trust the mobile banking application to make the fund
transfer? These can be expressed mainly by linguistic categories referable to
a set of numerical attributions (”very much” or ”likely”). While these two
aspects seem to be closely related, the perceived trustworthiness is affected
not only by the quality of the trustee, but also by the trustor’s own personal
perspectives that has nothing to do with the trustee.
But is the degree of trust the single factor to warrant the decision to trust
somebody for a specific task? We often hear conversations like:”I trust Paul
very much, but I am delegating this task to George this time.” This implies
that the decision to trust is not equal to the degree of trust. Trust cannot be
limited to a (positive) evaluation, an esteem of Y, and to a potential disposition
to relying on him. This potential has to translate into an act. On the basis
of such a valuation and expectation, X can decide to entrust Y within a given
”task”, that is to achieve a given goal thanks to Y’s competent action. ”To
trust” is both a decision and an action.
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Then what is the relationship between the degree of trust and the decision
to trust? Pears (1971) points out the relation between the level of confidence
in a belief and the likelihood of a person taking action based on the belief:
”Think of the person who makes a true statement based on adequate reasons,
but does not feel confident that it is true. Obviously, he is much less likely
to act on it, and, in the extreme case of lack of confidence, would not act on
it”. This illustrates a general principle that people act on their belief on the
basis of the degree of reliability and certainty they attribute to their beliefs. In
other words, the decision to trust is grounded on and derives from the degree
of trust.
The decision to trust is the decision to depend on another person to achieve our
own goals; the free intention to rely on others, to entrust others for our welfare.
However, to pass from a mere potential evaluation to a reliance disposition,
that is, the belief supporting the decision and the act to rely upon Y, the core
ingredients we just identified are not enough. Taking a real decision about
trusting or not is a complex process. In order that the trustor trusts the
trustee about a specific task, and thus delegates that task to the trustee, it is
not only necessary that the degree of trust for the trustee to carry out that
task exceeds a given threshold (which is dependent on the trustor, the trustee
and the task), but also that it constitutes the best solution (compared with
other possible and practicable solutions).
2.2.3 Trust Sources
In this section, we analyse the various sources that the trustor forms an expec-
tation (trust) about the trustee’s performance towards a specific task. While
we analyse these sources separately, the actual and aggregate expectation may
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be based on multiple sources and some of them may even contradict one an-
other.
The first source is the previous direct experience with the trustee for the
task T. For example, a customer has used the mobile banking application
to transfer funds previously. His expectation that the application is able to
make a successful transfer is very much based on the experience he had with
the application. If all his previous experiences are positive, he has high trust
towards the application to perform the next fund transfer. Otherwise, he may
not trust that the application can complete the fund transfer and will turn to
other means for the same task.
The second source of trust is by inference from the trustee’s class or group
or category. For example, a customer has used the mobile banking application
from bank A to bank B to transfer the fund. Now he needs to make the fund
transfer on a similar application from bank C. In this case, even though he
has no previous direct experience with this particular application from bank
C, his expectation or trust will be based on his trust on the applications in the
same category (applications from bank A to B). In this scenario, the trustee
is a member of a class, and the class as a whole has been trustworthy for the
task. Therefore, the trustee can also be trusted to perform the task.
The third source of trust is analogy from trustee Y to Y’ or from task T
to T’. For example, a customer has used the mobile banking application to
transfer the fund previously and now the mobile application has been upgraded
to a new version. Even though the trustor has no previous direct experience
with the new version, his trust in the new version will be based very much on
the trust he has in the old version. Similarly, if the customer needs to make
a bill payment, instead of a fund transfer, his trust that the application can
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perform the bill payment can be based on his experience with the fund transfer
task. However, such trust requires reasoning on a case-by-case basis. A major
upgrade or a totally different task may result in less trust or sometimes the
trust assessment may need to be restarted all over.
The fourth source of trust is through transitivity. In this scenario, a third
party is involved to help the trustor build the trust towards the trustee. The
third party is an authority or an expert to evaluate the trustee’s performance
and competence, and trusts that the trustee is able to perform the specific task
T. hence, the trustor forms an expectation that the trustee is trustworthy. The
third party usually is a government agency, or a well-recognized independent
organization and the evaluation is properly conducted via certification or en-
dorsement programs. For example, if the mobile banking application from
bank A is certified by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the customer
tends to believe that this application can be trusted.
The fifth source of trust comes from reputation. The trust from reputation is
not the same as the trust from transitivity in the sense that the third party is
usually not a specific authority or expert. Moreover, the trust is formed not by
certification or endorsement, but by experiences. If everybody is saying that
the mobile banking application is trustworthy, then it has a high reputation
and the trustor forms a positive expectation for the trustee to perform the
task.
The sixth source of trust is by norms and controls. While the trustee may be
able to violate the trust from the trustor, the social cost imposed by the norms
and controls of such violation is so high that the trustor can confidently form
an expectation that this would not happen. In countries such as Singapore,
the law is strict towards financial crimes and the penalty of breaching the trust
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is high. A customer builds an expectation that a mobile banking application
will be able to make a fund transfer as it has promised, without much doubt.
The seventh source of trust is affective trust. Affective trust is the confidence
one places in a partner on the basis of feelings generated by the level of care
and concern the partner demonstrates (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rempel
et al., 1985). It is characterized by feelings of security and perceived strength
of the relationship. The essence of affective trust is reliance on a partner
based on emotions. As emotional connections deepen, the trust in a partner
may venture beyond that which is justified by available knowledge. Affective
trust is in a sense ”marginal” relative to our research, but not marginal at all
from a complete and adequate account of trust and of its real significance and
functioning in human interaction.
The eighth source of trust is reciprocation trust. This means that if a trustor
places the trust on the trustee and makes the trustee aware of his expectation,
it makes the trustee have a higher self-esteem and determination to carry out
the task as required by the trustor. The trustee feels more responsible and
obliged not to disappoint the trustor’s expectation and not to betray the trust.
In other words, the trustor’s perceived trust in the trustee can affect both the
trustee’s motivations and his effort and competence. For example, if a mother
tells the boy that she trusts him to complete his homework on time, it becomes
an important motivation for the boy to do so.
There are also other sources of trust, such as generalized trust and trust
by default. Trust from those sources can be built due to the personality or
environment. For example, some people have the personal belief that every-
body needs to be trusted, unless he is proven not to not trustworthy. In some
environments, trusting each other has become a culture for everybody that
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people place their trust quite unconditionally, especially for tasks that do not
carry much risk.
2.2.4 The Negative Side of Trust: Mistrust, Distrust,
Lack of Trust & Doubt
In this section we will examine the concepts of mistrust, distrust, lack of trust
and doubt. These concepts are closely related to trust, and are complex issues
not to be simplified to be the opposite side of trust. By understanding each of
these concepts, we are able to have a better understanding of the full meaning
of trust.
Some scholars, viewing ”trust” as subjective probability of a favourable event,
consider trust as a continuum from 0 (completely no trust, or mistrust) to
1 (full trust). Others consider it as a value between -1 (negative ”trust” or
distrust) and +1 (full trust), where 0 would mean the lack of trust (see Figure
2-1). However, as both mistrust and distrust are specific evaluations about Y,
which are possibly based on specific ”qualities” (for example: ”He is a careless
guy” or ”He has a hidden agenda”), it is clear that it is not simply about
degrees of certainty or a value in a continuum.
In fact, as argued by Ulmann-Margalit (2001), trust and its negative counter-
parts are qualitatively different mental states. There exist diverse forms and
kinds of lack of trust, which are not just a matter of ”degree” or ”intensity”,
but must be analysed in their specific ingredients.
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Negative of Trust
There are two kinds of negative evaluations: inadequacy and dangerosity
(Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2000). Inadequacy (in the context of trust) means
that Y is not good enough (able to, apt, useful, adequate, or competent) to
achieve the goal. Dangerosity means that Y is ”good” (able to, apt, useful,
adequate, or competent), but for bad things (contrary to the goal), which may
sabotage the goal.
Figure 2-1: Negative side of trust
Correspondingly, there are two kinds of ’negative trust’ or two opposites of
trust: mistrust in Y as for not being good, able, competent to achieve the
goal and distrust towards Y as for being good, able, competent to achieve the
opposite of the goal. For example, when a project manager believes that a
team member is not competent or able to complete a task in the project, it
is mistrust. The manager is not afraid of the team member being dangerous
to the project; he is just convinced that the team member cannot or will not
complete the task effectively. On the other hand, when the project manager
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believes that a team member has the ability and power to sabotage the project,
it is distrust. The manager is not simply predicting a failure of task, but
probable harms from the team member to the entire project, because of the
power to do bad or dispositions of the team member. Another example is
people’s mistrust or distrust of politicians. When we say that we mistrust
the government, we believe that the government does not have the ability to
achieve the goal. However, when we say that we distrust the government, we
believe that the government may have hidden agenda that will cause harm to
the public.
Lack of Trust
Both mistrust and distrust clearly imply the ”lack of trust”, since the belief
that ”Y is NOT good for the goal” or ”Y is good, but for the opposite of the
goal” logically excludes trust, that is ”Y is good for the goal”. In both cases,
it is clear that X does not believe that Y can be trusted. However, there is
another scenario when X does not believe that Y can be trusted. This is when
X doesn’t know, has no idea, has not evaluated due to ignorance or pending
judgement. When ”X does NOT believe that Y can be trusted”, either X has
mistrust or distrust in Y or X doesn’t know how to evaluate Y or has not
evaluated Y. In the latter case, X is in doubt about Y. The ”lack of trust”
covers both doubt and the two negative sides of trust: distrust and mistrust.
If we introduce quantitative models to analyse trust, we get other insights that
are very interesting. When the trust X has in Y does not exceed the threshold
that X believes necessary for making the decision to entrust Y, this is called
insufficient trust, which is a form of relative lack of trust. In this case, the total
amount of trust may exceed the total amount of distrust, mistrust and doubt,
but the resulting net amount of trust is insufficient to warrant the decision to
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trust.
Figure 2-2: Insufficient trust: a relative form of lack of trust
2.2.5 Trust Dynamics
Trust is a dynamic and changing phenomenon because all the entities partic-
ipating in the trust relationship are subject to change over time. Especially
in complex interactions, there are never situations that are exactly the same
in different time instants. As Heraclitus pointed out, ”No man ever steps in
the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.”
Trust changes with the positive or negative experience of the trustor, with
the emotional or rational state of the trustor, with the additional or reduced
competence of the trustee, with the modification of the different sources it is
based on, with the changed context of the task that the trustee is supposed to
perform, and so on.
There are many studies in literature dealing with the dynamics of trust (Jonker
40
& Treur, 1999; Barber & Kim, 2000; Birk, 2000; Falcone & Castelfranchi,
2001). In this section, we will analyse the following three main basic aspects
of this phenomenon as follows:
• How trust changes on the basis of the trustor’s positive and negative
experiences;
• How trust is influenced by trust itself in several rather complex ways;
• How trust is transitioned from a particular task to another task.
The first case considers the well known phenomenon about the fact that trust
evolves in time and has a history, that is the trustor’s trust in the trustee
depends on the trustor’s previous experience and learning about the trustee.
It is true that in general a successful experience increases the trustor’s trust
in the trustee (and vice versa a failed experience decreases the trust). This is
illustrated in Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-3: Classical view of the trust reinforcement and decrement
The problem with this view of trust reinforcement and decrement is that trust
is modelled as a simple index, without taking into consideration that whenever
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a success or failure experience is gained by the trustor, he will interpret the
factors of the success or failure, especially for failures. People analyse the
result and attribute it to different factors, whether it is internal or external,
and whether it is due to occasional facts or stable quality attributes. Based
on this interpretation process, he will adjust his trust towards the trustee (See
Figure 2-4). For example, when a customer is performing a fund transfer
on a mobile banking application, suddenly his mobile phone loses network
connectivity and disrupts his transaction. This is an external factor, probably
due to the telecommunication service provider or the WIFI network his mobile
phone is connecting to. In this case, his trust in the mobile banking application
is not decreased. In fact, if he finds out when the connection is restored that
his transaction is ready to continue without repeating the steps that he has
performed, he will trust the application even more as the application can
survive a connection loss, which he probably did not take into consideration
when he first evaluated the application and formed his expectation.
Figure 2-4: View of trust reinforcement and decrement with interpretation
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The interpretation and analysis typically follows the following logical process
as illustrated in the table below. While both successes and failures will be
interpreted and analysed, people tend to focus more on the failures. Hence,
we will illustrate the process using failures. However, it should be noted that
the same process applies to successful experience as well. We also want to point
out that sometimes a success or a failure reveals more information about the
trustee, the task and even the perspectives of the trustor himself and all these
will impact the trust, which is not discussed here.
External/Internal Occasional/Stable Impact to trust
Internal Occasional Reduce the trust slightly
Internal Stable Reduce the trust dramatically
External Occasional Maintain the trust
External Stable Maintain the trust, but pay at-
tention to the external factors
Table 2.3: Interpretation of factors for the failure and its impact to trust
The dynamic nature of trust is also described by the second case where trust
is influenced by trust itself in several rather complex ways. While it is gener-
ally true that trust creates reciprocal trust (commitment), and distrust elicits
distrust, there are cases where a decision to trust actually decreases the trust-
worthiness of the trustee and a decision not to trust can make the trustee more
trustworthy for the trustor.
Let’s start with a real life example. As a parent of a 6 year old boy, sometimes
I really don’t trust him in handling some tasks that seem too difficult for him.
So on the night before his class excursion trip to the zoo, I told him that I would
help him to prepare himself next morning because I don’t trust that he could
do it all by himself under the time pressure as he needed to reach school half
an hour earlier than usual on that day. He was not pleased. The next morning
when he woke up, he quickly dressed himself, brushed his teeth and washed his
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face in less than 5 minutes and got himself ready, even before I realized that
I was supposed to help him. In this case, by knowing that I distrusted him
with certain tasks, he actually improved his performance and became more
trustworthy in my eyes. While the result in this case seems to be surprising, it
is actually not so upon closer inspection. In fact, people are knowingly using
this strategy to increase their trust by telling the trustee that they don’t trust
him. It is often used by parents, superiors, and sometimes peers to make their
target person (trustee) to improve their performance. This strategy is called
”Ji Jiang Fa” 1 in Chinese culture and it is a well-known management strategy.
It illustrates the idea that the lack of trust sometimes increases the trust.
The decision to trust can also decrease trustworthiness as well. For example,
during the bidding process of a project, several bidders are evaluated for their
competence and one of them is chosen to carry out the project. However, once
the contract is awarded to one of the bidders, knowing that the trustor has
placed the trust in him and there is no easy way for the trustor to switch to
other competitors, the winning bidder may start to evaluate his options under
new circumstances.
The last case considered is about whether it is possible to transfer the trust
that a trustor has in the trustee with a specific task to the trust in the same
trustee but for a different task. When the iPhone was first released, Apple
Inc. was still an IT company that designed, developed, and sold personal
computers. The big question on everyone’s minds was ”Can the consumers’
trust in Mac products transfer to the iPhone?” What if Apple Inc. decides
to make medical devices? Will the medical devices be perceived as appealing,
1”Ji Jiang Fa” is a Chinese term consisting of three characters: Ji, means stimulate;
Jiang, means undermine; and Fa, means strategy. It stimulates individuals to make greater
effort by undermining their confidence in achieving the goal. By doing so, individuals exert
extra efforts to achieve their personal potential, as all people are believed to want to strive
for excellence.
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reliable and achieving high performance like other products that Apple Inc. is
selling?
This is different from the models of trust just based on a simple measurement
of experience. We are interested to analyse situations where given the trustor’s
evaluation about the trustee’s trustworthiness on a specific task, what can we
say about a different but similar task? While trust is usually considered from
a single trustor’s point of view on a single trustee for a specific task, it would
actually be useful to have a trust model that permits trust to be transferred
among similar trustees for similar tasks. In this sense it would be effective
to evaluate the trust on a class of trustees for a class of tasks for reasons of
generality, optimization, economy, and scalability. A good understanding of
trust in this aspect would therefore help to predict how and when a trustor
who trusts someone for some tasks will trust someone else for some other tasks.
In our previous discussions on trust sources, we have already mentioned that
it is possible to transfer the trust from task to task and from trustee to trustee
as inference trust, and in this paragraph, we will analyse further how this
happens.
Let’s go back to the iPhone case. While iPhone is a new product, the compe-
tencies to design, develop and sell it are very much the same as competencies
for other Mac products that Apple Inc. has successfully gained the trust
from the consumers. There is of course a new competency that is required
(knowledge/skill for designing and manufacturing mobile devices), but after
all mobile phones and personal computers are all consumer electrical devices
and require very similar competencies. It also helped that the iPhone was
billed as a smartphone i.e. a phone which had the characteristics of a comput-
ing device, and thus sharing a lot of functionality with IT devices that Apple
Inc. was already well trusted to deliver excellent performance. This is very
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different from a furniture product or a grocery product such as instant noo-
dles. If Apple Inc. decides to make medical devices, the competency required
is very different from making iPhone or Mac products. Therefore, the trust
that the consumers have on their Mac products will not be easily transferred
to their medical devices. In conclusion, whether the trust can be transferred
depends on the similarity of the tasks, especially the underlying competencies
by which the tasks are performed. If the similar tasks require the same set
of core competencies, the trust can be transferred; if not, the trust cannot be
transferred easily. However, we have to point out that even though the trust
is transferable, the degree of trust will most likely be reduced, as the required
competency for two different tasks will not be the same.
This applies to the class of trustees as well. If the reasons I trust a particular
trustee can be found in other trustees in the same class, the trust can be
transferred. For example, I trust a certified public accountant Sherry to help
me to deal with my tax matters. In the absence of Sherry, I may trust her
colleague Nami to deal with my tax matters as long as Nami is also a certified
public accountant, because I know that both of them probably possess the
same competency in carrying out the task.
2.3 Trust in Information & Communications
Technology
In this section we will analyse the studies, models, simulations and experiments
that are trying to address the issues of trust in the information and commu-
nication technology. As we can see from the various definitions of trust drawn
from different social sciences, trust is always associated with human beings.
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It is odd to say that you trust some purely natural inanimate objects, such as
the sun. As pointed out by Sztompka (2006), ”objects of trust, even the most
abstract, are reducible to human actions; we ultimately trust human actions,
and only derivatively their conglomerates, effects or products”. This leads to
the question: does the concept of trust apply to objects that are created by
humans? The work of Muir (1987), Lee and Moray (1992; 1994), and Muir and
Moray (1996) on trust in human-machine systems offers a good starting point
in that direction. Their research focuses on the trust between humans and
machines. Bonnie Muir (1987) wrote a ground-breaking paper on the subject
by expanding the human-machine trust paradigm based on psychology and
sociology literature. In an effort to move from the realm of interpersonal in-
teractions between humans and machines, Muir crossed the two taxonomies
of Barber (1983) and Rempel et al. (1985) to form what she considered a
more complete two-dimensional taxonomy of human-computer trust. Muir’s
work was followed by two empirical studies by Lee and Moray who adjusted
her trust taxonomy by experiments on college students using a simulated pas-
teurization plant. They suggested that the trust dimensions of Barber (1983),
Remple et al. (1985), and Zuboff (1988) are actually complementary. Subse-
quently more researches in the Information and Communications Technology
domain, such as Human-Computer Interaction (Dix et al., 2004), Distributed
Artificial Intelligence (Wei, 1997), Multi-Agent Systems (Wooldridge, 2002;
Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008), and Networked-Computer Systems (Grid,
Semantic Web, etc. (Foster & Kesselman, 2003; Antoniou & van Harmelen,
2008; Davies, 2006)) start to address trust as an issue in information and
communication technology systems.
But why do we have to involve such a complex concept in this domain? This
could be attributed to two main reasons. Firstly, the Information and Commu-
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nications Technology paradigms are moving towards the human style, which
increase the number of people accessing to (and trusting) the new technolo-
gies. In fact, in the history of their evolution, humans have learnt to cooperate
with the new technologies in many ways similar to cooperating with human
beings. They have intentionally realized the diverse cooperative constructs
(purely interactional, technical-legal, organizational, socio-cognitive, etc.) for
establishing trust between technologies and human beings. Secondly, the In-
formation and Communications Technologies have become so complex and
unpredictable that more and more of them can be considered as complex sys-
tems that demonstrate a high level of complexity. As Luhmann (1979) argued
that in order to comprehend and reduce the complexity of trust functions,
trust therefore becomes an important factor for the users (human beings) to
make use of the technologies.
Therefore, is it not sufficient to consider just more technical and simply ap-
plicable notions like security? While security is a significant concern with
regards to the trust issue in the information and communications technology
domain, it is very different from the concept of trust. One important thing
to bear in mind is the conceptual difference between the two notions of secu-
rity and trust. In general, a secure system should guarantee a set of features,
such as identification, authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. There are
various research areas such as encryption (Ellis & Speed, 2001), cryptography
(Schneier, 1996; Stallings, 1999), authentication (Stallings, 2001), and access
control (Anderson, 2001) that develop techniques for achieving the above spec-
ified features of security. Some of this research makes explicit reference to trust
even if this concept is used in a very reductive and basic sense, oriented toward
strict security rather than the more complex and general concept of trust. The
distinction in the field is described by Rasmussen and Jansson (1996) between
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hard security and soft security, where hard security refers to the traditional
IT (Information Technology) security mechanisms such as those defined above
(access control, authentication, and so on) while soft security is about de-
ceitful and malicious service providers that provide misleading, tricky or false
information (Rasmussen and Jansson called this security ’social control mech-
anisms”).
In general, we can say that establishing a true trust relationship is a more
complex and different thing with respect to security matters: the techniques
mentioned above cannot guarantee that an interaction partner has the com-
petence that he claims or that he is honest about his own intentions. Trust is
more than secure communication, e.g., via public key cryptography techniques:
the reliability of information about the status of your trade partner has little
to do with the secure communication or with its identification. Maybe the
perceived security and safety are a pre-condition and also an aspect of trust,
but trust is a more complex and broad phenomenon.
Trust must give us tools for acting in a world that is in principle insecure, where
we have to make the decision to rely on someone in risky situations. For this
reason the trust challenge is more complex and advanced (and therefore more
ambitious) than the one about security, even if there are relationships between
them and the solutions to the security problems which represent a useful basis
for coping with trust problems.
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2.4 Function of Trust
2.4.1 The Glue of Society
It is well recognized that trust is crucial and vital in all kinds of social activi-
ties. Trust plays an essential role in economics, social operation, organization
management, business collaboration and so on. It is a common belief that
trust is the glue of society and plays an important role in every dimension of
the social life of a human being.
Some scholars believe that the most fundamental reason is that human be-
ings are social in a basic and objective sense: they live together and depend
on each other. More precisely according to Conte and Castelfranchi (Conte
& Castelfranchi, 1995), human beings are different from each other, both in
their skills and resources, and in their many desires and needs (and their sub-
jective opinion on their importance in life). Moreover, they live in the same
”environment”, that is, they interact with each other: the realization of the
goals of X is affected by the activity of Y in the same environment; Y can
create favourable or unfavourable conditions. Each agent has seriously lim-
ited powers (competencies, skills, resources) and cannot achieve all his/her
(potential) goals; but, by leveraging on the powers of others, he can satisfy
and develop he own goals. By leveraging on others (for example, via coop-
eration over common goals, or via exchange, or via domination, etc.) human
beings can multiply their powers and their achievements in an unbelievable
way. Also, there are powers that no single individual possesses (co-powers)
and cannot just be ”exchanged” or unilaterally exploited, which depend on
collaboration: only a multi-agent coordinated action can produce the desired
outcome. However, in order for this transformation of limits and dependence
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into an explosion of powers to be realized, X not only has to exploit Y (and
possibly vice versa) but he has to ”count on” this, to ”rely” on Y, to ”dele-
gate” the achievement of his own desire to Y’s action; in other words, to trust
Y. Dependence (and even awareness of dependence) without trust is nothing;
Y is still an inaccessible resource.
Trust must be based on some experience of Y (or similar people), on some
evaluation of Y’s competencies and features, on some expectation, and on the
decision to bet on this, to take some risk while relying on Y. Moreover, X can
rely on Y’s understanding of this reliance, on Y’s ”adoption” of X’s goal and
hope; on a positive (cooperative) attitude of Y (for whatever reason) towards
X’s delegation. This is precisely trust; the glue of society as the transition from
passive and powerless ”dependence” to active and empowering interdependent
relationships.
As we saw, trust is not just an attitude, a passive disposition, a cognitive
representation or an affective state towards another person. It is also an active
and pragmatic phenomenon; because cognition (and affect) is pragmatic in
general: for and in action, for realizing goals. So, trust is also an action
(deciding and performing an action of betting and relying on another person)
and part of social actions of exchange, collaboration, obedience, etc.
2.4.2 Complexity Reductor
Luhmann’s work (1979) focuses on the societal shift towards modernity and
identifies social complexity as one of the main reasons for our changing con-
ditions. Furthermore, from this Luhmann draws the conclusion that trust,
functioning as a complexity reductor, is and will continue to be an increasing
and prominent necessity within modern society. According to Luhmann, due
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to the increasingly fragmented and complex world, human beings throughout
history have never had as many options and choices as they do today. Beck
even goes so far as to say that our whole society of today should be seen as a
”risk” society, meaning that we have constantly have to make several decisions
with different risks associated with them (Beck, 1992). Indeed, the amount
of choices to be made as well as the information needed to make an informed
decision at any single moment in life has increased radically yet our cognitive
capacity to manage these choices and information has remained more or less
static. Society needs trust because it increasingly finds itself operating at the
edge between confidence in what is known from everyday experience, and con-
tingency of new possibilities. Without trust, all contingent possibilities have
to be considered, leading to a paralysis of inaction. Instead, trust can be seen
as a bet on one of the contingent futures - the one that may deliver benefits
(Sztompka, 1999). Once the bet is decided (i.e. trust is granted), the trustor
suspends his or her disbelief, and the possibility of a negative course of action
is not considered at all. Because of this, trust, functioning as a reductor of
social complexity, allows for decisions and actions in situations that are other-
wise too complex to be analysed using quantitative normative methods. Thus,
part of Luhmann’s thesis is that trust enables us to make these choices more
effectively on more or less grounded knowledge or emotions due to the limited
capacity to process information. And this is becoming an increasingly promi-
nent way in our lives and will continue to gain importance as society moves
towards even greater complexity.
Luhmann distinguishes between personal trust and system trust with the moti-
vation of personal familiarity becoming increasingly rare in the complex mod-
ern world yet at the same time the need for trust is increasing (Luhmann,
1979). However, Luhmann regards the system specifically as a social system
52
where trust is placed in the system but additionally in the trust of other mem-
bers (”I trust in others’ trust”). As previously stated, Luhmann’s thesis is
that personal trust is subsiding in favour of system trust. In the case of the
information systems space, the question of the role of personal and system
trust takes on a new dimension since it is in fact taking place within a techni-
cal system. As Luhmann indicates, the move towards system trust raises the
question of whether we are dealing with trust or rather something acting as a
functional substitute (Luhmann, 1979; Sztompka, 1999). That is, something
displaying the same qualities as we would expect from trusting behaviour yet
being based on something other than ”trust”. This becomes especially rele-
vant in the discussion of how technologies based on metrics and probabilities
relate to trust.
The rapid development of information and communication technologies in the
past decades has also introduced technological complexity into the field of
financial services information systems. Thus, in light of technological com-
plexity in addition to social complexity, Luhmann’s focus on complexity and
his notion of trust as a reductor of complexity (social and technological) in





3.1 Trust Typology in Financial Services In-
formation Systems
Scholars have examined the subject of trust over the last half a century
(Deutsch, 1958) and have defined the term in a variety of ways. Mayer, Davis
and Schoorman (Mayer et al., 1995) defined trust as a ”willingness to be vul-
nerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective
of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. The role of trust in
social interaction and human affairs cannot be overstated and the concept
of trust has been examined in countless studies. Research shows that the
type of trust varies - trust may develop between individuals (Johnson-George
& Swap, 1982); between individuals and organizations (Zaheer et al., 1998);
and between individuals and Information Systems (Lippert, 2001; Lippert &
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Swiercz, 2005; Lippert & Davis, 2006).
Researchers have developed different trust topologies to analyse the basis on
which trust is founded, developed and maintained. Mayer, Davis and Schoor-
man (Mayer et al., 1995) perceived trust as a function of three broad fac-
tors: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Sako (1992; 1998) differentiates be-
tween contractual trust (”will the other party carry out its contractual agree-
ments?”), competence trust (”is the other party capable of doing what it says
it will do?”) and goodwill trust (”will the other party make an open-ended
commitment to take initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from taking
unfair advantage?”). Faulkner (2000) distinguishes between calculative trust,
predictive trust, and affective trust.
3.1.1 Trust Topology
We propose a trust topology based on three major elements - reputation,
experience and communication to understand the major elements of the trust
relationship between the systems and its end users.
Reputation trust is the trust based on the reputation of the associated and
constituent agents of the systems. It can be considered as the opinion and
evaluation of the end users towards a person, a group of people, an organization
or a system. The associated agents are agents that have a certain level of
relationship with the system but are not part of the system e.g. the regulatory
agency, the user communities, etc. The constituent agents are the parts of
the system such as hardware and software, as well as the support team of
the system. Reputation can be derived from prior experience. For example,
when a project manager delivers a high performance system in the past and is
appointed to manage a new system, people will have trust in the new system
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based on his reputation from the past experience. Reputation can also come
from current experience as when an end user has a very positive experience
with the system and recommends the system to his friends. The reputation of
the system creates a trust relationship between the users and the system.
Experience trust is a collective reflection of the performance, reliability, ro-
bustness and usability of the system as experienced directly by the users. The
trust relationship improves when the experience matches or exceeds the ex-
pectation of the end user and falters when the experience does not meet their
expectations. Experience trust is associated with a measure of confidence
which increases as the end user encounters positive experiences. After suc-
cessful interactions, the trust level increases and conversely, after unsuccessful
interactions the trust level decreases. With no prior experience, trust takes an
initial trust level depending on the system’s reputation.
Experience trust is derived directly from the capability of the system, and
seems to be identical with the trust derived from capability. We base experi-
ence trust on the perceived capability of the system rather than the inherent
capability itself; thus, capability and perceived capability are two different
concepts. First, the capability of the system may not be fully experienced by
the end user and hence, he will have the wrong impression of the system. For
example, suppose a new user just starts to use the system and experiences
an incident with the system on the very first day itself. This user will hardly
have any experience trust in the system but would form an adverse opinion
about the capability of the system even though this could be the first incident
involving the system over the past ten years. Second, the capability of the
system may not match the expectation of the end user and thus the end user
has little experience trust. For example, a new high-performance foreign ex-
change information system may not satisfy the end user if it does not support
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the features of the legacy system that the traders have got used to. In both
cases, the system will need a communication process to correct the distrust
created by the gap between actual and perceived capability of the system.
Communication trust is created through the communication process between
the end users and the system. Communication plays an important role in
the development and rehabilitation process of the trust relationship. There
are two types of communication - information sharing and feedback. Trust is
based on beliefs about the other party which are shaped through information.
Research shows that higher levels of trust are associated with the quality
of information communicated. Thus, end users exhibit higher level of trust
towards the system when they believe the information they are receiving from
the system is accurate, timely, and/or useful. Research also shows that a strong
relationship exists between the flow of information and trust. Similar to the
quality of information, getting enough information from the system tends to
increase the end user’s trust in the system (Barbacci, 2003). Trust is also
based on the experience that meets or exceeds expectation. The system needs
to seek feedback from the end users to understand their expectations. Likewise,
the end users need to give feedback to the system about their experience of
the system relative to these expectations. An effective feedback loop that
provides timely updates increases the chance that the system understands the
expectation of the end users and is able to gather the information required to
initiate corrective action. If it succeeds in improving the experience based on
the feedback collected, it will increase the end users’ trust in the system.
Communication trust is the outcome of communication behaviours and in-
cludes properties of these behaviours like transparency, accuracy and respon-
siveness. Providing accurate, relevant and timely information, giving expla-
nations for decisions and demonstrating sincere and appropriate openness are
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examples of communication behaviour that promote this kind of trust in the
system.
Based on the trust topology we have proposed previously, we define the Trust
(T) as a function of combined elements Reputation (R), Experience (E), Com-
munication (C) plus an unknown element () (that cannot be defined in terms
of these elements). Thus,
T = f(R,E,C) +  (3.1)
To verity the relation between the Trust and the three elements of reputation,
experience and communication, we use the common device of correlation and
covariance to analyse the relationship. A correlation is a single number that
describes the degree of relationship between two variables. A covariance is a
measure of how much two random variables change together.
We design an on-line survey to collect respondents’ opinion of their trust (T) of
a particular financial services information system of their own choice, and the
reputation (R), experience (E) and communication (C) of the financial services
information system respectively. For each variable, the respondent’s opinion
is assessed by multiple questions, each carrying a value ranging between 1
(lowest) and 5 (highest). The final score of the respondent’s opinion on any
variable is an average score of these questions. Table 3.1 shows the result of the
survey and the relationships between the trust and the reputation, experience
and communication are presented in Figures 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 respectively.
The correlations and covariances of trust and the three elements are shown in
Table 3.2.
This shows that trust has positive correlation with all the three elements. It
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Respondent Trust Reputation Experience Communication
1 2.6 3.5 4 4
2 1.8 3.5 3.25 3.5
3 2.4 3 3 3
4 2.2 3.75 4 3.75
5 2.4 3 3 3.25
6 3 4.75 4 3.5
7 2.2 4 4 3.25
8 3.8 4 4.25 3.5
9 2.8 3.25 4.25 4
10 3.2 4.25 4.5 3.5
Table 3.1: Survey result of trust elements
Figure 3-1: Relationship between trust and reputation
Figure 3-2: Relationship between trust and experience
has the strongest correlation with the experience (0.61) followed by the rep-
utation (0.45). However, we recognize that the communication of financial
services information systems has a very low correlation (0.15) with trust of
the system. We analyse the data and find out that it is due to one of the
questions we use to assess the communication of the financial services infor-
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Figure 3-3: Relationship between trust and communication
Trust Reputation Experience Communication
Correlation 0.45 0.61 0.15
Covariance 0.13 0.17 0.24
Table 3.2: Correlation and Covariance Summary
mation systems. The respondents are asked whether they are informed of new
features in advance. The answer to this question is very random and does not
seem to link with the respondent’s trust in the system. We think that while
communication is still relevant to people’s trust, whether or not they receive
routine updates of the new feature, is not an important parameter of commu-
nication. We remove this question from the survey result and the correlation
between the trust and the communication increases to 0.59 (See Table 3.3 and
Figure 3.4).
Respondent Trust Reputation Experience Communication
1 2.6 3.5 4 4
2 1.8 3.5 3.25 3.67
3 2.4 3 3 3
4 2.2 3.75 4 4
5 2.4 3 3 3.33
6 3 4.75 4 4.33
7 2.2 4 4 3.67
8 3.8 4 4.25 4.33
9 2.8 3.25 4.25 4.33
10 3.2 4.25 4.5 4
Table 3.3: Survey result of trust elements - modified
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Figure 3-4: Relationship between trust and communication - modified
Trust Reputation Experience Communication
Correlation 0.45 0.61 0.59
Covariance 0.13 0.17 0.14
Table 3.4: Correlation and Covariance Summary - modified
We further extended the survey to another forty respondents. The findings
are presented below and and detailed results and respondents profiles are pre-
sented in Appendix A. A profile analysis was conducted and the finding shows
that there is no major difference between different age group, gender or pro-
fession. In conclusion, trust is positively correlated with the three elements
of reputation, experience and communication; however, the correlation is not
strong, which suggests that these elements are influential, but there are other
factors to be considered.
Trust Reputation Experience Communication
Correlation 0.43 0.65 0.57
Covariance 0.11 0.14 0.15
Table 3.5: Correlation and Covariance Summary - Extended
3.1.2 Trust Development Model
Next, we derive a trust development model based on the reputation-experience-
communication trust topology which has been discussed above. This devel-
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opment model consists of three processes that build, rehabilitate and transfer
trust. The trust building process (See Figure 3-1) consists of three stages,
namely the pre-relationship, initial and stable stages. In the very beginning,
when there is no relationship between the user and the system, no trust might
be presumed to exist. Subsequently, the user comes to acquire information
about the system and is able to decide whether the system can be trusted
or not, and how much trust one can place in the system. As the user has
not started using the system and acquired experience with the system, the
assessment is based purely on the reputation of the associated and constituent
agents of the system. This assessment enables the user to form an opinion
about the system and to decide whether to accept the system for the user’s
intended purpose. At this point, initial trust comprising solely of reputation
trust is established. This constitutes the initial stage. After initial trust is
created, the user starts using the system and gains direct experience about
the system. The trust relationship improves when the experience meets or
exceeds the expectation and falters when the experience is below expectation.
Initially, the trust relationship is subject to a lot of fluctuation but slowly it
reaches a stable level. At this point, trust is composed of reputation trust
and experience trust but experience trust constitutes the main element of the
trust relationship. It is noteworthy to point out that communication plays a
role in both stages; however, during the initial stage, communication helps to
build up the reputation of the system, which leads to trust; while at the stable
stage, the communication is part of the experience.
The trust rehabilitation process (see Figure 3-2) continues from the trust build-
ing process, and maintains, restores and improves the trust relationship be-
tween the system and its user. The literature on trust focuses on the trust
building process but does not address what happens once the trust has been
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Figure 3-5: Trust building process
established. The properties of the financial services information systems sug-
gest that it is not sufficient to focus on building the trust; instead continuous
effort must be devoted to maintaining and rehabilitating the trust relationship
after it has been built.
There are four activities in the trust rehabilitation process. The first activity
is to maintain the trust in the system by continuing the actions taken during
the trust building process. Unlike the trust building process, these actions
will not improve the trust relationship further once it has reached a particular
level. However, if we were to discontinue such actions, the trust level will drop
over time. The second activity removes distrust in the system. The occur-
rence of negative incidents creates distrust in the system, deeply affecting the
trust relationship. The level of distrust is determined by the magnitude of
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Figure 3-6: Trust rehabilitation process
the negative experience and the perceived intentionality of the agent (of the
system) responsible. In order to remove distrust, the user’s bad experience
needs to be replaced with good experience, and the intentionality needs to be
communicated clearly. The third activity is to improve the actual experience
itself by addressing the causes that lead to the bad experience. The fourth
activity is to adapt to changes to the system as a result of changes in the user
requirements. For example, when there is a regulatory change or a technical
breakthrough, the user’s requirements will change. The system needs to adapt
quickly to meet the changed expectation of the user. The trust rehabilitation
process generates communication trust and experience trust. The activity
of removing distrust, improving experience and adapting to changes involves
a lot of communication effort. Communication trust between the user and
the system is created as a result of this communication behaviour which in-
cludes information sharing and feedback. The trust rehabilitation process also
tackles the challenge of removing distrust in the financial services information
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systems. Even a minor incident will damage the trust relationship built up by
the other trust processes creating distrust; we therefore need to have a trust
rehabilitation process to remove the distrust in the system.
The financial services information systems change at a fast pace; as a result,
the system will become a different version of the original system after a series
of changes over a short period of time. Trust in the system should not be
treated as a static property; it needs to be changed to the trust in the evolved
system through the trust rehabilitation process.
The trust transfer process (See Figure 3-3) transfers the trust that has been
accumulated in the system by the trust building and rehabilitation processes
to the new system. Reputation is the medium that stores the trust for transfer.
The transfer happens in two dimensions - over time and across system scale.
Figure 3-7: Trust transfer process
The trust transfer process in the time dimension occurs between the current
system and the future system that replaces it. Over time, due to changes
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in user requirements and technology, the current system will be replaced by
the new system to meet the expectation of the users. We need to be able
to transfer the trust accumulated in the current system to the new system;
otherwise, all the effort put in the trust building and rehabilitation process
will be wasted. There are various activities in this time dimension of the
trust transfer process but the main focus of these activities is transfer of trust
between the new and the old systems. The trust transfer process in the system
scale dimension horizon occurs between the system and the System of Systems
(SoS) of which it is a part. At the system level, reputation trust is based on the
reputation of the associated and constituent agents of the system. Applying
this reasoning to the SoS level, the reputation of a particular system forms a
part of the reputation trust in the SoS. The main activity in this dimension
of the trust transfer process is between the system and the SoS. Together,
activities in these two dimensions of the trust transfer process - focused mainly
on reputation trust, address the challenges posed by a fast changing financial
services information system.
The trust topology and development model presented in this section offers
ideas on the nature of the trust relationship in the financial services informa-
tion systems and how to manage it. The financial services information systems
possess unique properties such as operating in an environment where a high
level of trust is required but also where a significant level of distrust can co-exist
simultaneously; changing at a fast pace and forming an SoS. Each property
creates a challenge to managing the trust relationship in the financial services
information systems. The new framework suggested addresses these challenges
and postulates that the trust relationship is composed of three elements - rep-
utation, experience and communication trust. Based on this topology, we also
propose a trust development model consisting of three processes - trust build-
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ing, trust rehabilitation and trust transfer. While the trust building process
has been discussed intensively in the literature, the trust rehabilitation and
transfer processes offer solutions to the challenges in managing the trust rela-
tionship in a fast changing financial services information system that operates
in a (trust) demanding environment. Specifically, the trust rehabilitation pro-
cess removes the distrust in the environment, and transfers accumulated trust
over time as the system adapts to new user requirements that meet / exceed
the user’s expectation. The trust transfer process passes on the accumulated
trust in a system to its successors as well as to the entire SoS. Further research
is necessary to validate the concepts proposed in the trust topology and devel-
opment model for financial services information systems, as well as the means
of employing the concepts in a useful manner in the real world.
3.2 Trust and Quality Attributes
Trust is dependent on quality to some extent. Quality instils trust in the cus-
tomers using the system. Software quality is (1) the degree to which a system,
component, or process meets specified requirements and (2) the degree in which
a system, component, or process meets customer or user needs or expectations.
Different schools of thought have different sets of quality attributes. The ISO
Standard 8402 (1991) defines quality as ”the totality of features and character-
istics of a product or service that bears on its ability to satisfy stated or implied
needs”. Various models or frameworks have been proposed to define quality
and related attributes. The ISO Standard 9126 (2001) provides a hierarchical
framework for quality definition, which includes the six top quality attributes:
functionality, reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability, and portability.
Robert B. Grady (1992) proposed the FURPS model for classifying software
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quality attributes, which is an acronym of functionality, usability, reliability,
performance and supportability. When dealing with database systems, an-
other model of RASR (reliability, availability, scalability and recoverability) is
often used. Mario Barbacci (2003) proposed a model consisting of 4 quality
attributes: performance, dependability, security and safety. In this study, we
focus on the following list of quality attributes: functionality, performance,
usability, reliability, security and availability. We believe this list of quality
attributes contains the most important quality attributes in building the trust
in financial services information systems.
Quality attributes sometimes conflict with each other. For example, a system
with a lot of features probably suffers from performance, as the resources are
heavily occupied. The developers need to analyse trade-offs between multiple
conflicting attributes to satisfy user requirements. The ultimate goal is the
ability to quantitatively evaluate and trade off multiple quality attributes to
arrive at a better overall system (global optimum). We should not look at a
single, universal metric, but rather at quantification of individual attributes
and trade-off between these different metrics to achieve a global optimum (see
Figure 3-4). Users experience these system qualities and are not necessarily
acquainted with their technical definition. Trust is based on the trustwor-
thiness of the system, as evaluated by the perceived quality attributes of the
system. As we have an explicit goal of building trust in the system, the degree
of the impact level of the quality attributes in trust building also needs to be
taken into consideration.
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FSIS Quality Attributes Relationship to Trust Elements
Performance: the degree in
which a system or component ac-
complishes its designated func-
tions within given constraints,
such as speed, accuracy, or mem-
ory usage.
Performance is how well the system provides the
services. Clearly, if the performance is good, the
customer will have better experience and hence,
the system will have a better reputation.
Availability: the degree in
which a system or component is
operational and accessible when
required for use.
Availability is how easy and convenient the sys-
tem provides the services. It improves the user
experience.
Reliability: the ability of a de-
vice or system to perform a re-
quired function under stated con-
ditions for a specified period of
time.
Reliability improves the reputation of the sys-
tem. When there is a reliability issue, it be-
comes crucial for the system to communicate to
the users what is happening in an accurate and
timely manner. Reliability has an impact on
the communication trust.
Usability: the ease in which a
user can learn to operate, prepare
inputs for, and interpret outputs
of a system or component.
Usability improves the experience trust of the
system. An easy-to-use system typically fosters
strong experience trust on the system. Usabil-
ity is also part of the communication process,
as when the user uses the system, it is actually
communicating with the system. Hence, usabil-
ity also has its impact on communication trust.
Functionality: a set of at-
tributes that bear the existence of
a set of functions and their speci-
fied properties. The functions are
those that satisfy stated or im-
plied needs.
Functionality is related to the user experience
and it typically reflects on the user requirements
which is collected via communication. Hence,
this also has an impact on communication trust.
Security: secure systems are
those that can be trusted to keep
secrets and safeguard privacy.
Security is the capability of a system to pre-
vent malicious or accidental actions outside of
the designed usage, and to prevent disclosure
or loss of information. Security affects the rep-
utation most, but it also has an impact on the
experience.
Table 3.6: Quality attributes and trust elements
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Figure 3-8: Quality attributes trade-offs
3.2.1 Relationship between Trust and Quality Attributes
As we have analysed in Table 3.8 and Figure 3-8, trust elements reputation (R),
experience (E) and communication (C) are impacted by the quality attributes:
performance (P), availability (A), reliability (L), usability (U), functionality
(F) and security (S). So trust (T) can also be expressed as:
T = f(P,A, L, U, F, S) +  (3.2)
The relation between quality attributes and the trust is analysed. As we
elaborate in the previous section, trust is a function of quality attributes, such
as performance, availability, reliability, usability, functionality and security.
We need to highlight that there are other quality attributes impacting trust,
and there are unknown elements that impact the trust in a way that we are
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unsure about, such as familiarity and preference. As quality attributes may
conflict with each other, and developers need to make trade-off decisions to
achieve the system optimum, it is important to prioritize the quality attributes
in terms of trust building to serve as a guide for the developers to consider at
the very beginning of the development life cycle.
The relationship of quality attributes to the trust elements is subjective in
nature, hence this study uses Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets (IFS) to analyse cor-
relation of quality attributes (q) to trust elements (t) in the form of a triplet
(µq(t), νq(t), piq(t)), where µq(t) is the degree of membership of quality at-
tribute to trust element; νq(t) is the degree of non-membership of quality
attribute to trust element; and piq(t) is the degree of uncertainty of quality
attribute to the trust element.
A set is a collection of elements. If i is a member of a set S, we write i∈S;
if not, we write i/∈S. In the concept of Sets, the membership of an element is
either yes or no.
χs : U → {0, 1} (3.3)
Zadeh (1965) introduced ”Fuzzy Sets” where he replaced the membership func-
tion to
δs : U → {[0, 1]} (3.4)
Membership in Fuzzy Sets is a generalization of characteristic function and
gives a ”degree of membership”.
Atanassov (1986) proposed an extension of Fuzzy Sets, by adding a new de-
gree of uncertainty. It is named Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets because the way of
fuzzification contains the intuitionistic idea. Some basic definitions of IFS are
given below.
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Definition 1: Consider a set E. An IFS A in E is defined as an object of the
following form
A = {(x, µA(x), νA(x))|x ∈ E}, (3.5)
where the functions:
µA : E → [0, 1] (3.6)
and
νA : E → [0, 1] (3.7)
defines the degree of membership and the degree of non-membership of the
element x ∈E respectively. For every x∈E,
0 ≤ µA + νA ≤ 1 (3.8)
Obviously, each ordinary fuzzy set may be written as
{(x, µA(x), 1− µA(x))|x ∈ E} (3.9)
Definition 2: The value of
ΠA(x) = 1− µA(x)− νA(x) (3.10)
is called the degree of non-determinacy (or uncertainty) of the element xinE
to the IFS A. This may cater to either membership value or non-membership
value or both.
IFS based models may be adequate in situations where we face human testi-




• I am not sure
Today, IFS is widely used in the process of decision-making, artificial intelli-
gence, medical diagnoses, chemistry, and other fields.
We take the following steps to prioritize the quality attributes based on the
user’s trust on the financial services information system:
• Step 1: Identify and select the major quality attributes that affect the
user’s trust in financial services information system;
• Step 2: Obtain the degree of quality attributes to trust elements from
the users through on-line surveys in the form of IFS;
• Step 3: Compute the effective contribution (without hesitation) of qual-
ity attributes to trust elements by subtracting the product of non-membership
and uncertainty part from the membership part (µ(x)-ν(x) ∗ pi(x));
• Obtain the effect of quality attribute on comprehensive trust by taking
the Σ of memberships of quality attributes to trust elements.
• Quality attributes have been prioritized on the basis on their effect on
trust.
We design an on-line survey to collect the user’s opinion. The result is shown
below in Table 3-2, 3-3, 3-5.
Quality Attributes Reputation Experience Communication
Performance 0.6 0.7 0.5
Usability 0.9 0.7 0.7
Reliability 0.7 0.7 0.7
Availability 0.5 0.8 0.6
Security 0.68 0.6 0.4
Functionality 0.6 0.8 0.7
Table 3.7: Effective contribution of quality attributes to the trust elements
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Table 3.9: Prioritization of quality attributes
This shows that for the purpose of building trust in the financial services in-
formation systems, usability and functionality are the most important quality
attributes we should consider. Interestingly, security is the least important
quality attribute.
3.2.2 Research Limitations
The research up to his point concludes that trust in financial services informa-
tion systems is impacted by quality attributes, such as performance, availabil-
ity, reliability, usability, functionality, security, etc. We also prioritize these
qualities in the order of their impact to trust to serve as a guide for system de-
velopers to design and build financial services information systems where the
trust is an explicit goal. However, we also notice that different people often
have different levels of trust in the same financial services information system.
Sometimes even for the same customer, he may have different levels of trust in
different situations. This shows that a person’s trust is also impacted by other
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factors, which are not related to the system itself, but are more likely related
to how people decide whether a particular system is trustworthy or not. To
understand trust from this perspective, we propose to study the social aspect





As previously discussed in Chapter 3, a person’s trust is also impacted by
other factors, which is more likely related to how a person decides on whether
a particular system is trustworthy or not. To understand trust from this
perspective, we will have to study the social aspect of trust in financial services
information systems.
Trust has been studied as a relationship between humans in multiple social
sciences. The targets that people place their trust in range from individuals
to social groups, institutions and organizations. It has also been noted by
some researchers that trust can be extended to human created objects, such
as machines. Engineering systems, composed of interacting components, are
designed by humans to accomplish a purpose. These systems play increas-
ingly important roles in human society and trust by humans in such systems
adds an interesting dimension to the study of trust. In this section, we will
examine trust in engineering systems with a review of the trust in humans and
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human-created objects such as machines. We apply the sociological models of
trust to analyse trust in engineering systems. The issue of complexity in engi-
neering systems, contributed by technology and human factors, distinguishes
engineering systems from traditional machines. A trust model for engineering
systems is proposed based on perceived complexity, generalized expectation
and risk exposure. We will also discuss distrust, the opposite of trust, and
how to improve human trust in engineering systems. We then propose sev-
eral recommendations based on this model for a typical engineering system -
on-line banking portals.
4.1 Introduction
Trust is a fundamental fact of human life. It has been investigated in many
social sciences including sociology, psychology, organizational theory and eco-
nomics. In the words of sociologist Piotr Sztompka: ”trust is a bet on the
future contingent actions of others” (Sztompka, 1999). In psychology, trust is
believing that the person who is trusted, will do what is expected. It starts
with the family and grows to trust in others.In organizational life, trust enables
people to take risks: ”where there is trust, there is the feeling that others will
not take advantage of me” (Porter et al., 1975). Trust is based on the expec-
tation that one will find what is expected rather than what is feared (Deutsch,
1973). Trust in economics is treated as an explanation for a difference between
actual human behaviour and what can be explained by the individual desire
to maximize one’s utility.
As we can see from the various definitions of trust drawn from different social
sciences, trust is always associated with human beings. It is odd to say that
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you trust some purely natural objects, such as the sun. As pointed out by
Sztompka (2006), ”objects of trust, even the most abstract, are reducible to
human actions; we ultimately trust human actions, and only derivatively their
conglomerates, effects, or products”. This leads to the question: does the con-
cept of trust apply to objects that are created by humans? The work of Muir
(1987), Lee and Moray (1992; 1994), and Muir and Moray (1996) on trust in
human-machine systems offers a good starting point in that direction. Their
research focuses on the trust between humans and machines. Bonnie Muir
(1987) wrote a ground-breaking paper on the subject by modifying human-
machine trust paradigms from psychology and sociology literature. In an ef-
fort to move from the realm of interpersonal interactions between humans and
machines, Muir crossed the two taxonomies of Barber (1983) and Rempel et
al. (1985) to form what she considered a more complete two-dimensional tax-
onomy of human-computer trust. Muir’s work was followed by two empirical
studies by Lee and Moray who adjusted her trust taxonomy by experiments
on college students using a simulated pasteurization plant. They suggested
that the trust dimensions of Barber (1983), Remple et al. (1985), and Zuboff
(1988) are actually complementary.
However, as machines evolve into engineering systems, these humanmachine
trust models are inadequate to address the issue of trust in complex systems.
Engineering systems are systems designed by humans having some purpose
and are composed of interacting components (Moses, 2004). Some examples
are given as follows:
• Airbus A380 aircraft
• Linux Operating System
• Citibank’s online banking portal
• Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing system
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• Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit
• TEPCO Nuclear plant
Although the examples cited are large-scale systems, it does not mean that
engineering systems must be large. The iPhone is a small device in terms
of size but is also a good example of an engineering system. The iPhone
concept consists of not just the iPhone (the mobile phone device), but also its
connection to the iTunes store that makes it easy and affordable to license your
favourite songs from a vast repertoire of published music. When we compare
engineering systems to other human-created objects, in particular, machines,
we observe some important differences. Engineering systems that are being
designed, manufactured or operated today have a level of complexity that was
unimaginable not long ago in the machine era. For example, the latest Linux
release 2.6.39 in May 2011 has 14,619,185 lines of code. The Airbus A380
aircraft has over 4 million parts. Even for a small mobile phone, it has sub-
systems like camera, GPS, microphone, speaker, keyboard, antenna, display
screen, circuit board and the operating system. Each of these sub-systems
is complex as well. The Android operating system, which is widely used on
mobile phones, consists of roughly 12 million lines of code including 3 million
lines of XML, 2.8 million lines of C, 2.1 million lines of Java, and 1.75 million
lines of C++. As a comparison, a Ford Model T has about 2000 parts and no
software component.
One of the reasons for the high complexity is that engineering systems are
created from a melding of different technologies and not just a single one. We
are living in an era in which technology is driving the development of society
and changing the everyday life of human beings. Our technological devices are
increasingly designed to work together as a system. In general, the technology
is reliable, and we expect the same result each time we use it. A circuit board
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is expected to behave as designed and can be created millions of times. This
allows systems to be built in a multi-layered fashion, incorporating reliable
components wherever needed. It hides the complexity of the sub-systems and
allows systems of ever increasing functionality and complexity to be built.
Another reason for complexity is due to the fact that engineering systems
are designed, manufactured and operated by humans working within orga-
nizations. The idea of organizing people of different specialities into project
teams is in itself the result of increasing product complexity which required the
coordination of knowledge from more than a single speciality. Nowadays, or-
ganizations not only organize engineers into project teams to work on projects
but they also incorporate systems created by other organizations into their
own system. No doubt this raises complexity to another level. The inter-
actions between humans and engineering systems are more complicated than
that between humans and stand-alone pieces of machinery. Things become
even more complicated if human activity is considered part of an engineering
system as humans have been the most unreliable and unpredictable factors in
any system of activity.
Software complexity is a term that encompasses numerous properties of a
piece of software, all of which affect internal interactions. As the number of
entities increases, the number of interactions between them would increase
exponentially, and it would get to a point where it would be impossible to
know and understand all of them. Similarly, higher levels of complexity in
software increase the risk of unintentionally interfering with interactions and
so increases the chance of introducing defects when making changes. In more
extreme cases, it can make modifying the software virtually impossible.
Many measures of software complexity have been proposed. Many of these,
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although yielding a good representation of complexity, do not lend themselves
to easy measurement. Some of the more commonly used metrics are:
• McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity metric
• Halsteads software science metrics
• Branching complexity (Sneed Metric)
• Data access complexity (Card Metric)
• Data complexity (Chapin Metric)
• Data flow complexity (Elshof Metric)
• Decisional complexity (McClure Metric)
To summarize, the main issue in engineering systems is the complexity con-
tributed by technology and human factors. If we are going to research on
the trust in engineering systems, we need to understand the relation between
complexity and trust. Fortunately, many sociologists have developed theories
of trust, which can be leveraged on to study trust in engineering systems.
4.2 Theory of Trust from Sociology
Among the contributions of sociologists who contributed to the topic of trust,
the theory by Niklas Luhmann, a German sociologist, and a prominent thinker
in sociological systems theory is still the richest and clearest.
Luhmann’s theory of trust centres on the issue of complexity (Luhmann, 1979).
He argues that trust is associated with a reduction of complexity, and more
specifically, of that complexity which enters the world in consequence of the
freedom of other human beings. Trust functions so as to comprehend and
reduce this complexity.
This can be explained with the following example. People who want to use
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the on-line banking portal to make payments have to first trust that the on-
line banking system will perform the transactions as expected. How can they
contemplate doing so without trust? The on-line banking system is a very
complicated system. If we adopted the view that rational decision making
is based on information, people would need to possess and process a lot of
information about the banking system in order to even decide whether or not
to use it. They would have to understand how the system was built, how the
components interact with each other to accomplish their purpose, whether the
programmers who built the code have integrity and don’t build a back door
to steal their accounts, or whether the operating team is following the rec-
ommended maintenance process to ensure the system’s health etc. Requiring
a full understanding of complex systems for rational decision making would
effectively disable people from taking any significant action at all. In the real
world, there is only a brief period of time available to assess the situation and
make a decision. So, only a little of the complexity of the situation can be
grasped through the information available. People could still choose to investi-
gate and gather all the relevant information about a system before committing
to action but they don’t seem to do this all the time. Instead, they simply
choose to trust that the on-line banking system will function as expected, and
then spend more time to process other information that helps them accomplish
their task.
Other influential definitions construe trust as a general expectation about other
people and the social systems in which they are embedded. For example, the
American sociologist Bernard Barber (1983) characterized trust as a set of
”socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each
other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, and of the
natural, and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for
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their lives”. In his book ”The Logic and Limits of Trust” (Barber, 1983), he
describes three expectations as follows:
• Expectation of the persistence and fulfilment of the natural and moral
social orders;
• Expectation of ”technically competent role performance” from those we
interact with in social relationships and systems;
• Expectation that partners in the interaction will ”carry out their fidu-
ciary obligations and responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain sit-
uations to place others’ interests before their own.”
Another factor to be considered in defining trust is the level of risk exposure.
Since the early years of studies about trust, risk has been considered as one
of the closest concepts linked to trust and one of the most important factors
that lead to trust decisions. Trust is a solution for specific problems of risk
(Luhmann, 2000) and trust is intimately related to risk (Sztompka, 1999).
Risk itself is activated as a result of the trust we confer, the decision we make
and the action we take.
4.3 Trust Model for Engineering Systems
The sociological trust theories we have discussed will be adopted in this chap-
ter as a basis for the development of a model of trust relationships in human-
engineering systems. The following model of trust in human-engineering sys-
tems is proposed.
Human’s trust (T) is the expectation (E) generalized from past experience,
against the stake at risk (R) and the perceived complexity(C) of the system.
Several aspects of this definition should be noted. Trust in the engineering
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system is subjective and personal. Different people have different levels of
trust in the same engineering system. An adventurous technopreneur may
think that the new A380 aircraft can be totally trusted, while some other
people may wait and see before they decide to take a flight on it. This is due
to the fact that each person brings into the trust evaluation different levels of
E, R and C.
Trust needs history as a reliable background (Luhmann, 1979). The expecta-
tion is generalized from past experience. As we understand, generalization is
to extend the specific experience to less specific scenarios. Hence the expec-
tation generalized from past experience suggests a reduction of information.
It also suggests an indirect experience. This is to say that to confer trust on
an engineering system, it is not necessary that you have direct experience of
it. You use the Citibank’s on-line banking system for the first time, yet you
trust that the transaction will go through without having prior experience.
The reason is that you may have indirect experience of it. You may have
made transactions with another bank’s on-line portal, or you have heard from
your colleagues that transactions on-line with Citibank are safe and reliable.
All these indirect experiences will create a certain level of expectation for you
about Citibank’s on-line banking portal.
Risk has been a universal and eternal feature of human society. But it is in
this era that the scale of risk has become significant and its presence is ev-
erywhere. According to Giddens (1990), both the presence and perception of
risk is stronger than ever before. He points out that one of the reasons is the
pervasiveness of complex, huge, impersonal technological ”abstract systems”
whereby principles of operation are not fully transparent to ordinary people,
but on whose reliability everyday life depends. The recent unfortunate nuclear
accident that happened in Japan illustrates this point. The risk of nuclear en-
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ergy was known to the residents, and yet they trusted the safety measures that
had been put in place, otherwise they would have relocated somewhere else
at whatever cost it took. They have judged the level of risk to be acceptable
given the safety measures put in place, and it had been the norm to live with
the risk.
Risk has many definitions. Traditionally, risk was defined as the potential
loss that a chosen action or activity may lead to. However, the contemporary
definition of risk suggests that risk equals to the product of the probability of
an incident and the loss resulting from the incident. Therefore, risk actually
refers to the former i.e. the potential loss. Complexity in engineering sys-
tems is sometimes beyond an ordinary person’s ability to comprehend entirely.
Hence, many of the components and sub-systems are taken will be assumed to
function as intended by the designer. The complexity is the perceived level of
complexity, and not one that is related to any objective measure of complexity
that can be computed from the parts of the system and the density of con-
nections between them. This leads to the observation that human beings are
in general over-confident and place more trust than what engineering systems
deserve.
4.4 Trust and Distrust
Trust reduces complexity. According to Luhmann, distrust is the functional
equivalent of trust (Luhmann, 1979). Anyone who refuses to trust restores the
complexity in the situation and leaves the problem unresolved, as he burdens
himself with too much information to process in order to take rational action.
Hence, reducing complexity in a negative way creates distrust. For example,
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many of us distrust the Windows OS as it is prone to malicious computer
virus attacks. This is not to say that we have processed all the information
and know for sure that it will be attacked by a virus. Most of the time, we
simply reduce the complexity negatively and decide to exclude options without
much careful thought. As distrust is a functional equivalent of trust, the same
formula for trust should still apply except that the value of the expectation is
negative.
We also need to leverage on the concept of a psychological threshold to carry
the discussion further. A threshold denotes an artificial discontinuity which
demarcates an area of experience before and after the threshold. One can
assume that the experience remains without distinction until the threshold is
crossed. For example, in general I trust the mobile phone to trigger the alarm
if I have set the reminder. This works for events like a soccer game, a birthday
party, or a movie but I would probably turn to more reliable means if it is for
an examination or a paper submission. This is because when the risk is higher,
the trust we can confer becomes lower and at one point, it is lower than the
threshold and results in the decision to distrust. As illustrated in Figure 4-1,
T(gross) represents the trust we can confer on an engineering system based on
the expectation, risk and complexity. T(threshold) is the threshold that we
decide whether the T(gross) is adequate for us to commit the trust. Note that
the T(threshold) is also a subjective and personal value in distrust.
4.5 Managing Trust in Engineering Systems
The foregoing discussion of trust allows us to make several recommendations
to manage human trust in engineering systems. As the model suggests, trust
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Figure 4-1: Trust and distrust thresholds
can be improved by the following means:
(1) Exceed the expectation by delivering superior experience;
(2) Reduce the risk exposure;
(3) Reduce the perceived complexity;
We will illustrate the means of accomplishing these goals on a typical type
of engineering systems such as the on-line banking portal systems. On-line
banking (or Internet banking) allows customers to conduct financial transac-
tions in a secure website operated by their retail or virtual bank. Currently,
all major retail banks in Singapore provide on-line banking services. The com-
mon features of on-line banking portals fall broadly into several categories: (a)
transactional (payments to third parties, fund transfers, investment purchase
or sale, loan applications and transactions); (b) non-transactional (download-
ing bank statements, viewing images of paid cheques) and (c) features unique
to on-line banking such as personal financial management support. Some on-
line banking platforms support account aggregation to allow the customers to
monitor all of their accounts in one place whether they are with their main
bank or with other institutions.
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On-line banking portals demonstrate the characteristics of engineering sys-
tems: they are designed, built and operated by human beings and they are
composed of interacting components or sub-systems to accomplish the purpose
of providing financial services on the Internet. These systems are technolog-
ically enabled and are the result of the rapid development of Internet. They
are built and managed by big organizations and the human activities within
the organizations contribute to the issue of complexity.
To improve the trust in such systems, we need to deliver experience that will
raise the expectation by improving the quality attributes of such systems.
Trust is impacted by quality attributes such as performance, availability, re-
liability, usability, functionality, security, etc (Chan & Ying, 2010a,b,c). A
technical incident which occurred in 2010 on DBS’s (Development Bank of
Singapore) on-line banking portal serves to illustrate the impact of these qual-
ity attributes on trust in a system. DBS is Singapore’s largest local bank. A
technical glitch affected its entire on-line system for over seven hours. Starting
from 8 a.m. on 5th July, 2010, customers who tried to log on to DBS Bank’s
on-line banking services found that the system was down. The banking out-
age sparked anger and frustration among customers who needed to access the
system urgently. This probably led to some level of distrust about relying ex-
clusively on on-line banking, or relying on the services of a single bank. Poor
availability and reliability of the system resulted in a loss of trust of a specific
system.
Another way to raise expectation is to promote the good reputation of on-line
banking systems via communication. This has been investigated previously for
financial services information systems (Chan & Ying, 2010b). For example,
when Standard Chartered Bank won the award of ”Best Consumer Internet
Bank” in Malaysia and Singapore, it ran an advertisement in the newspapers
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to inform the public. This helps to associate an indirect experience with the
on-line banking portal of Standard Chartered Bank and raises the expectation
of potential customers.
There are two ways to reduce the risk in engineering systems. The first is to
mitigate the risk directly with the help of technology. For example, opening
an on-line banking account carries a risk that the password can be stolen by
someone else, as anyone who has the password and the account number will
be able to gain access and perform transactions. This risk can be mitigated
significantly by the technology called two-factor authentication (2FA). It is an
approach to authentication which requires the presentation of two different
kinds of evidence that someone is who they say they are. It is a part of
the broader family of multi-factor authentication, which is a defence in depth
approach to security. From a security perspective, the idea is to use evidence
which have separate range of attack vectors (e.g. logical, physical) leading
to more complex attack scenarios that are difficult for fraud perpetrators to
execute and consequently, lower the risk. The 2FA technology is adopted by
all on-line banking portals in Singapore.
Banks 2 Factors required
OCBC Password, SMS One Time Password (OTP)
DBS Password, RSA Token
UOB Password, RSA Token or SMS OTP
HSBC Password, RSA Token
Citibank Password, SMS OTP
StanChart Password, SMS OTP
Table 4.1: 2FA adopted by on-line banking portals
Another way to reduce the risk in the engineering system is to provide a sanc-
tion facility. Since 2000, the banking industry regulator - the Monetary Au-
thority of Singapore (MAS), has introduced laws and regulations governing the
conduct of internet banking. It requires that the banks be responsible for as-
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sessing and managing the risks associated with their operations, including the
adoption of new technologies. Bank management must pay special attention
to security, especially technology-related, liquidity and operational risks that
may be accentuated in internet banking. In 2008, MAS (2008) published the
third edition of ”Internet Banking and Technology Risk Management Guide-
lines” to regulate the on-line banking portals in Singapore. With strict and
thorough regulations in place, trust in the systems is improved as the risk is
reduced.
There are two ways to reduce the complexity perceived by humans on engi-
neering systems: (1) to communicate the complexity thoroughly and make it
familiar and understandable to ordinary people so that the complexity will not
be perceived negatively; (2) to encapsulate the complexity by presenting the
component as an atomic, consistent, isolated and durable component.
When the on-line banking portals adopted the concept of 2FA, they explained
to customers why this was being introduced and how this was more secure.
The banks sent detailed letters to customers, and explained the technology
in the FAQ page on-line. The MAS also issued circulars to endorse the in-
dustry’s adoption of 2FA technology to enhance security. These efforts made
the technology understandable to the ordinary user and reduced the perceived
complexity. While most of the banks initially used an RSA token to be the
second factor, they later found the device increased the level of complexity in
the system. Some of them started to explore and provide other methods, such
as SMS OTP. The SMS Token proved to be well accepted by ordinary users
as it involved the mobile phone which was familiar to everyone.
However, it is not always beneficial to communicate all the technical details
to the users. Most of the technologies used in the systems are too complicated
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for ordinary people to understand, nor would they normally be bothered to
do so under ordinary circumstances. For example, the previously described
incident involving the outage of the DBS on-line banking portal was caused
by the wrong procedure being used to replace a faulty cable in the storage sub-
systems. Although this was communicated to the public, it did not explain
the relevance of a storage sub-system to the outage, or what went wrong in the
procedure, and how the replacement of a cable could result in a 7-hour outage.
It is unlikely that ordinary people will understand the technical details behind
the working of a storage sub-system, or the complexities of a procedure to
replace a cable in the system. However, not revealing the elements involved in
the outage without a plausible account of the sequence of events that involved
these elements left the public constructing its own version of events. The
credulity of the public with regards to the bank’s explanation was strained,
and this could increase the difficulty of further communication with customers.
In the case of the RSA token used for the 2FA technology, banks did not
explain the technical details of the devices to the public. They presented the
RSA token as an atomic, consistent, isolated and durable device that people
can rely on to perform its function.
In summary, to raise human trust in engineering systems, we can raise the
expectation by delivering better experience and linking indirect experience
such as establishing good reputation through communications. We can also
reduce the risk in the systems with the help of technology or a sanction or
endorsement facility external to the system. We can also decrease the perceived
complexity by explaining the technology in a way that helps people understand
it and by hiding unnecessary technical detail.
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4.6 Research Limitations
With both technical and social perspectives taken into consideration, it seems
that we have a comprehensive framework to help system developers and archi-
tects design and build trustworthy financial services information systems. Yet,
in reality, we have seen many applications, which are designed and built by
good system developers and architect, fail to gain the trust of the customers
and sometimes even damaged that trust in surprising, unexpected or unpre-
dictable ways. While it is still important to build trust in the systems using
the findings from both technical and social perspectives as discussed in this
chapter, it is also important to note that not all the issues related to trust can
be designed or engineered out due to a lack of knowledge, resources or time.
The increasing complexity of the systems and the environment that those sys-
tems are operating in calls for a different approach to manage trust effectively





Trust plays an important role in software development. Financial services
information systems are engineering systems operating in a complex world.
That makes software projects of any significant size complex endeavours. The
response to this is seen in the increasing popularity of the Agile development
methodology.
The Agile development methodology is a conceptual software development
process framework that adopts an iterative approach, open collaboration, and
process adaptability throughout the development life-cycle. In February 2001,
17 software developers published the Agile Manifesto (Beck et al., 2001), to
define an alternative approach of software development. The Agile Manifesto
places great emphasis on the Agile team and the role of the individuals within
the team.
There are a number of software development methods under the umbrella
of the Agile development methodology. Each Agile method details various
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Agile Practice Description
Daily Stand-up The daily stand-up is a short daily status team meet-
ing lasting a maximum of 10-15 minutes typically
conducted at the same time each day. The meeting is
conducted with team members standing up. During
the meeting team members explain briefly what they
accomplished since the previous meeting, what will
be completed by the next meeting and indicate any
impediments that may prevent them from completing
these tasks.
Iteration Planning The iteration planning session is a meeting that takes
place at the start of each iteration where the team col-
lectively defines and plans tasks that must be com-
pleted during the next iteration.
Retrospective An iteration retrospective is a meeting that is held
at the end of each iteration where the project team
reflects on what went well in the iteration, what did
not, and what could be improved for future iterations.
Table 5.1: Three common Agile practices
practices that distinguish it from other Agile methods but they all follow the
same underlying set of principles. Each Agile team is free to and encouraged
to choose and adopt the practices that suit their environment or that work
well for them, bearing in mind that these practices may span several Agile
methods. These Agile practices may be for product management (e.g. user
stories, incremental development), relate to planning (e.g. iteration planning),
or could relate to team performance (e.g. co-located team, retrospective).
Table 5.1 highlights the most common practices by Agile teams.
In this chapter we use a social complexity approach to investigate the soft-
ware development process. By looking at software development as a complex
endeavour, and using tools and techniques from the Cynefin framework and
other models of social complexity, we demonstrate that the increased level of
complexity of the software has led to an increase in the level of complexity
of the software development process. It transforms the software development
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process from a simple and complicated process to a complex one. Trust, which
functions to resolve complexity, becomes an important factor in such a soft-
ware development environment. We also propose that to effectively manage
trust in the software or information systems of financial services industry, it
is important to make sense of the situation and respond differently based on
the domain that the situation categorized according to the Cynefin framework.
We also propose several techniques to manage trust for financial services in-
formation systems that belong to the complex domain.
5.1 Introduction
Trust is a crucial factor for the information systems or software used in the
business organizations of the finance services industry. It has a positive effect
on customer satisfaction - a higher level of trust leads to a high level of cus-
tomer loyalty (Ouyang, 2010). A customer (a financial services firm) which
does not trust the software is likely to seek another business partner to pro-
vide the required services. Due to the complexity of many of the financial
services provided, trust in software plays a significant role in the development
and maintenance of successful relationships between the business organizations
in the financial services industry. While the trust in the software is mainly
determined by the quality attributes of the software experienced during its
use such as functionality, performance, usability, reliability, security and avail-
ability (Chan & Ying, 2010a), it is also impacted by the way the customers
experiences the systems, the risk associated with the tasks they want the sys-
tems to perform and the complexity of the system (Chan & Ying, 2011). This
trust is also impacted by the level of trust in the development process of the
software.
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During the last decade, software development has seen a shift in how projects
are procured and delivered, from the more traditional ”waterfall” approach to
the faster Agile approach. Agile software development is a group of method-
ologies based on iterative development, open collaboration and an adaptive
process (Chan & Ying, 2013). The intention of its original proponents was
to build a newer, more responsive system development methodology to re-
place older programming methodologies. The new system is better suited to
a changed world in which work is distributed among self-organizing, cross-
functional and interdependent teams. The movement started in 2001 with the
creation of the Agile Manifesto (Beck et al., 2001), which places great empha-
sis on the Agile team and the role of the individuals within the team. Teams
should be self-organizing and self-managing, contain motivated individuals, be
provided with the environment and support they need, and be trusted to get
the job done. Agile methodology is growing in popularity - according to the
8th annual State of Agile survey (Richardson, 2014) released on 30 Jan 2014,
88% of the software development organizations surveyed are practicing Agile,
and 52% of the projects are managed using some form of Agile methodology.
What is the reason for the Agile methodology popularity? The effectiveness of
traditional software development methodology (such as the waterfall model)
is measured against the project management ’triangle’ including scope, cost,
and schedule, at the centre of which is the quality of the software. These
are still important considerations for users of the Agile methodology. For ex-
ample, 82% of the survey participants adopted Agile methodology because it
enhanced software quality and 83% chose faster time-to-market as a key ben-
efit. The survey also revealed that the Agile methodology was chosen over
traditional software development methods for reasons such as the ability to
manage changing priorities, increased productivity and improved project vis-
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ibility. This shows that the complex software development environment has
different criteria to measure the effectiveness of software development teams
and the methodologies they use. It is no longer dominated by just considera-
tions of budget, requirement, schedule and quality. Agile methodology shifts
the focus from simply managing the technical process of creating the system
based on functional and quality attributes, to a focus on maintaining relation-
ships between client, project lead and development team expressed in terms
of expectations, goals, requirements and outcomes. This perspective is closer
to the issue of maintaining trust relationships.
Figure 5-1: The project management triangle
It has been suggested (Corbitt et al., 2004; Casey, 2010) that trust plays an
important role in the software development environment, especially in com-
plex circumstances. Could this be one of the reasons that the Agile method-
ology is chosen over traditional software development methods? Does Agile
methodology always work? Is Agile methodology always a winner compared
to traditional methods, or does the choice of the development method depend
on the situation? What are the criteria to decide when to prefer Agile over
traditional methods? To answer these questions, we need to understand more
about complex systems and how software development is a complex endeavour.
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5.2 Complex Systems
Complex systems are groups or organizations which are made up of many
interacting parts. In such a system, the individual parts are called ”compo-
nents” or ”agents” and the interactions between them often lead to emergent
system level behaviours which are not easily predicted from the knowledge of
the behaviour of the individual agents. Examples of complex systems include
the climate system, foreign exchange markets, ant colonies, immune systems,
Internet and human society.
The study of complex systems represents a new approach to science that inves-
tigates how relationships between parts give rise to the collective behaviour of
a system, and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its envi-
ronment. It is one of the most revolutionary products of 20th century thought.
Theories of chaos, complexity and emergence have shattered the conceptual
frameworks of science, technology and economics, and provide unifying themes
across previously distant disciplines. Scientists, sociologists, economists and
engineers are finding common ground that transcends the terms of reference
of each particular field. Knowledge of complex systems is used to model pro-
cesses in computer science, biology, economics, physics, chemistry and many
other fields.
Paul Cilliers (1998) provided a set of criteria for complex systems, which de-
scribes the unique characteristics of complex systems:
1. The number of elements is sufficiently large that conventional descrip-
tions (e.g. a system of differential equations) cease to assist in under-
standing the system; the elements must also interact and the interaction
must be dynamic. Interactions can be physical or involve the change of
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information.
2. Such interactions are rich, i.e., any element in the system is affected and
they affect several other systems.
3. The interactions are non-linear which means that small causes can have
large results.
4. Interactions are primarily but not exclusively with immediate neighbours
and the nature of the influence is modulated.
5. Any interaction can feedback onto itself (recurrence) directly or after a
number of intervening stages and such feedback can vary in quality.
6. Such systems are open; it may be difficult or impossible to define system
boundaries.
7. Complex systems operate under far from equilibrium conditions; there
must be a constant flow of energy to maintain the organization of the
system as a coherent entity.
8. All complex systems have a history; they evolve and their past is co-
responsible for their present behaviour
9. Elements in the system are ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a
whole responding only to what is available to it locally
Rzevski and Skobelev (2007) add an important characteristic to Cilliers’ list:
emergence. Essentially, emergence means that problems and solutions arise
from circumstances, often unpredictably. The following is a set of criteria for
complex systems defined by Rzevski and Skobelev .
1. Interaction: A complex system consists of a large number of diverse
components (Agents) engaged in rich interaction;
2. Autonomy: Agents are largely autonomous but subject to certain laws,
rules or norms; there is no central control but agent behaviour is not
random;
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3. Emergence: Global behaviour of a complex system ”emerges” from the
interaction of agents and is therefore unpredictable;
4. Far From Equilibrium: Complex systems are ”far from equilibrium”
because frequent occurrences of disruptive events do not allow the system
to return to equilibrium;
5. Nonlinearity: Nonlinearity occasionally causes an insignificant input
to be amplified into an extreme event (butterfly effect);
6. Self-organization: Complex systems are capable of self-organization in
response to disruptive events;
7. Co-evolution: Complex systems irreversibly co-evolve with their envi-
ronments.
Is software development a complex domain? The software development process
seems to fulfil all of the seven characteristics. For example, the developers
are autonomous and a lot of interactions take place during the development
process. In spite of detailed project plans, the actual delivery time, cost and
scope usually is usually unpredictable. Sometimes, a single mistake may cause
a huge delay not proportional to the initial impetus. Our research does not
provide quantitative proof to decide this question; however, interesting insights
are gained when we treat software development as complex.
5.3 Cynefin Framework
Complex systems principles drive a considerable amount of research, mainly
using computing power to simulate natural phenomena through agent-based
models. This has achieved a lot of success. Well-known examples include rout-
ing optimization of airfreight and telecommunication signals based on large vol-
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ume data modelling in which each agent is programmed to operate on simple
rules, resulting in the emergence of complex patterns of behaviour. However,
can this approach be applied to a software development team? Can we use a
computer model to simulate the outcome of the project, with a defined require-
ment and resources as input and developers as agents following certain rules?
There are at least three important differences between human organizations
and those of ant colonies that make it more difficult or almost impossible to
simulate using computer models. Chan and Ying (2014) discussed each of the
differences as given below.
Developers are not limited to one identity. In a development team, each de-
veloper has multiple roles - both in individual and collective capacities. As an
individual, the developer can be a parent, spouse, or a child and will behave
differently depending on the context. Collectively, developers might be part
of different social communities, such as JAVA developers, Agile developers or
Foreign Exchange Developers and it is not possible to predict which context
has more influence in any given problem situation.
Developers are not limited to acting in accordance with predetermined rules. It
is possible to impose structure on the team and rules on the individual devel-
opers as a result of collective agreements or management directives. However,
quite often an individual developer acts according to his own free will depend-
ing on his interpretation of these rules. Best practices and guidelines are not
hard rules for developers to follow blindly, unlike the case of agents and the
simple rules in a computer model.
Developers are not limited to acting on local patterns. Developers have a high
capacity of awareness of large-scale patterns because of their ability to commu-
nicate over official communication channels and social media even over vast
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geographical distances. This means that to simulate human interaction, all
scales of awareness must be considered rather than settling on just one circle
of influence for an agent.
These three differences in the human context make agent-based simulation
inadequate as a tool to study software development as a complex system.
Instead, we turn to a social complexity tool called the Cynefin framework.
The Cynefin framework was developed by Snowden and Kurtz between 1999
and 2003, synthesizing concepts developed by Boisot (1995), Cilliers (1998)
and others, to help visualize and understand how systems operate within a
variety of domains. Cynefin postulates a possible characterization of complex
system into the five domains as depicted in Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2: The various domains of the Cynefin model
The Cynefin framework (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) describes a perspective on
the evolutionary nature of complex systems, including their inherent uncer-
tainty and unpredictability. It provides a typology of contexts that guides
what sort of explanations or solutions might apply. It draws from research
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into complex adaptive systems theory, cognitive science, anthropology, and
narrative patterns, as well as evolutionary psychology to describe problems,
situations, and systems. It ”explores the relationship between man, experience,
and context” (Rzevski & Louisa-Jayne, 2004) and proposes new approaches to
communication, decision-making, policy-making, and knowledge management
in complex social environments. The Cynefin sense-making model has been
described in a number of papers and will not be covered in detail here. In
addition to the sense-making model, the Cynefin method contains a number
of techniques and exercises which can be used to help groups make sense of
their domain and helping them understand which methods and techniques are
appropriate.
The Cynefin framework has five domains (Snowden, 2005) and they are dis-
cussed in details below.
The first domain is the ”simple” domain in which the relationship between
cause and effect is widely accepted as a valid explanation of events and phe-
nomenon. It is predictable in advance and is self-evident or obvious to any
reasonable person. In this domain, if you take action X, it always causes result
Y, no matter how many times action X is taken. We apply best practices and
the approach is to ”sense - categorise - respond”. Events can be categorized
into predetermined categories. In the ”simple” domain, we first see what is
coming, and then make it fit with the predetermined categories and thereafter
decide what to do. For example, a clerk in a banking institution needs to
calculate compound interest. Best practice is applied in terms of predefined
formulae and when an input is given, the results are always the same.
Systems that operate in a stable context characterized by clear cause-and-effect
relationships easily discernible by everyone, are themselves fairly well defined
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and simple or sequential in their activities. The variability of the environment
is narrow. People know what to expect, and each event or action carries with it
a limited number of potential outcomes that are predictable. Uncertainty and
turbulence are minimal. Cause-and-effect relationships are clear and well un-
derstood by everyone. ”Right” answers are often self-evident and undisputed.
This context might be called the domain of ”known knowns” (See Figure 5-3),
and most decisions are unquestioned because everyone shares a common un-
derstanding. Decision makers can typically sense, categorize what information
they gather, and respond directly. Simple contexts are heavily process-oriented
situations typically managed through the application of standard practice.
Both managers and employees have access to the information they need, and
a command-and-control style is usually preferred. Adhering to best practice
makes sense, and process re-engineering is a typical tool (Snowden & Boone,
2007). Some examples of systems that would fall into this domain would be
automobile repair shops, retail merchandise stores, fast food restaurants, mu-
nicipal government departments, church congregations, and help desks that
follow prescribed patterns of questions and answers in responding to common
problems.
The second domain is the ”complicated” domain, in which the relationship
between cause and effect does exist, however, the answer is not self-evident and
requires analysis or some other form of investigation and/or the application
of expert knowledge. In complicated domain, the result is predictable, but
requires expertise to understand. There can be several different ways of doing
things in this domain, and successful outcomes can be obtained with the right
expertise. We apply the good practice and the approach is to ”sense - analyse -
respond”. In the complicated domain, we first see what is coming, investigate
or analyse using expert knowledge and then decide what to do.
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Snowden and Boone, who conceived the Cynefin framework, refer to the com-
plicated part of the framework as the domain of experts (Snowden & Boone,
2007). There is a reason for this. Complicated domains do not have single right
answers to problems. There may be several effective answers but these are not
as straightforward as in the simple domain. In the complicated domain the
relationship between cause and effect still holds, although such relationships
may not be obvious. Whether or not they are obvious depends on the depth
of one’s knowledge about the environment and the system. Variability and
uncertainty increase in a complicated environment, increasing the potential
range of problems as well as the number of possible right answers.
In Figure 5-3, this is the realm of known unknowns: We know the questions
to ask but we do not know the answers. Thus, the cause-and-effect analysis is
only as good as the knowledge of system or environment that one has available.
Fortunately, in the complicated domain, that information is usually available
somewhere and it can be found by research.
The third domain is the ”complex” domain, in which the relationship between
cause and effect can only be perceived in retrospect, and not in advance;
furthermore, the results are unpredictable. The recommended approach is to
”probe - sense - respond” - also called emergent practice. Complex systems
are therefore dispositional and not causal. Here, we need to create safe to
fail experiments and not attempt to create fail safe design. We cannot solve
complex problems with best or good practices alone. While conducting safe
to fail experiments, we must dampen the parts that fail and amplify the parts
that succeed. In this domain we get emergent order and practice that is often
unique.
Most people, if asked, would say that their systems qualify as complex. This
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may well be true in some cases, but those whose systems are really simple or
complicated systems tend to think so, too. What defines a complex system?
The key difference between a complex system and one that is merely com-
plicated is the inclusion of the concept of emergence. Essentially, emergence
means that problems and solutions arise from circumstances, often unpre-
dictably. Complex systems have large numbers of components, often called
agents, that interact and adapt or learn (Holland, 2006). The key to complex
systems is a high degree of adaptive capacity, making them resilient in the
face of perturbation. Agents within the system have some latitude to react to
those circumstances by changing the system, though both the system and its
internal agents constrain one another.
The old saying that the only thing constant is change applies in complex
adaptive systems. A bad quarter, a change in management, or a merger or
acquisition introduce unpredictability, uncertainty, and flux. In the complex
domain, it is often only after the fact that we can understand why things hap-
pen (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Perhaps the best examples are major financial
collapses, such as Enron in 2000 and the international financial collapse of
2008. The dangers may have been clear to a few in each case, but it was not
until after events unfolded that the complex causality became clear. In fact,
in complex domains most confusing or disconcerting issues that arise without
apparent forewarning appear obvious on hindsight.
The fourth domain is the ”chaotic” domain, in which there is no apparent
relationship between cause and effect at the systems level. The approach is to
”act - sense - respond” and we encounter novel practice here. In this domain,
we have to stabilise the position quickly.
Cause-and-effect relationships are both operative and discernible in the simple
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and complicated domains. It is also potentially useful in the complex domain
if the necessary content knowledge is available and it is clearly recognized that
its results can have a fairly short ”shelf life” (i.e., a periodic re-do may be
necessary). But as the name implies, the chaotic domain is turbulent and
highly uncertain. In the chaotic domain, cause-and-effect analysis is likely to
be nearly useless. Causes and effects may not be perceivable, and if they were,
the environment may be changing so fast that there is no time to conduct an
orderly cause-effect analysis. Waiting for patterns to emerge may be a waste
of time, or a recipe for disaster (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). This is the realm
of unknown unknowns (See Figure 5-3), and probably even unknowables. It is
a highly tense situation, with many decisions needing to be made and no time
for reflection or contemplation about them.
The fifth domain is ”disorder”, which is the state of not knowing what type
of causality exists and in which state people will revert to their own comfort
zone in making a decision.
In the Cynefin framework, the domain of disorder abuts all the others. This
is intended to signify that an organization in a given domain (simple, compli-
cated, complex, chaotic) can easily slip into disorder. As Snowden and Boone
(2007) describe it:” The very nature of the fifth context - disorder - makes it
particularly difficult to recognize when one is in it. Here, multiple perspectives
jostle for prominence, factional leaders argue with one another, and cacophony
rules. The way out of this realm is to break down the situation into constituent
parts and assign each to one of the other four realms. Leaders can then make
decisions and intervene in contextually appropriate ways.
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Figure 5-3: Knowledge quadrants
Figure 5-4: Cynefin dynamics
Kurtz and Snowden (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) also consider transitions be-
tween the domains. Situations change over time. As our knowledge increases,
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there is a natural progression clockwise from Chaos to the Known, while forces
of disorder tend to push systems the opposite way. Transitions can be grad-
ual or sudden, and can be decisively one-way, or an oscillation between two
domains. Figure 5-4 identifies the typical transitions with some explanatory
labels.
5.4 Trust in Complex Systems
As we are studying the software development as a social complex system, we
focus on the trust issue from the perspective of sociology. When it comes to
trust, sociology is concerned with the role of trust in social systems. Interest
in trust has grown significantly since the early eighties, from the early works
of Luhmann (1979), Barber (1983) and Giddens (1990). Society needs trust
because it increasingly finds itself operating at the edge between confidence in
what is known from everyday experience, and contingency of new possibilities.
Without trust, all contingent possibilities have to be considered, leading to a
paralysis of inaction. Instead, trust can be seen as a bet on one of the contin-
gent futures the one that may deliver benefits (Sztompka, 1999). Once the bet
is decided (i.e. trust is granted), the trustor suspends his or her disbelief, and
the possibility of a negative course of action is not considered at all. Because
of this, trust acts as a reductor of social complexity, allowing for decisions
and actions in situations that are otherwise too complex to be analysed using
quantitative normative methods. In particular, we are interested in decisions
to cooperate in complex software development situations.
The emphasis in complexity theory on unpredictability does not surprise sociol-
ogists, but reinforces what they already know. The existence of unpredictable
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phenomena may have come as a shock to those natural scientists who bought
into a Newtonian picture of a deterministic universe. But the majority of so-
ciologists already accept that the social world is not predictable and cannot
be understood by undertaking linear operations on quantitative information
about social phenomena. Research on the role of trust in society can be ap-
plied to a social complex system and helps to manage the unpredictability
caused by the complexity.
5.4.1 Research Method
In this study, we designed an experiment to validate two hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is that a more complex software product demands a more complex
software development environment, whilst simple [complicated] software only
needs simple [complicated] software development environments respectively.
The second hypothesis is that the Agile methodology works better in a com-
plex software development environment than in a simple [complicated] one as
it is able to create a high-trust environment to manage the unpredictability.
A piece of software that meets the criteria specified by Rzevski and Skobelev
(2007) is considered as complex software; conversely, one that does not meet
the criteria is considered as simple [complicated]. Examples of the latter type
of software include standalone applications such as a calculator program, Mi-
crosoft Word, Matlab, or even computer operating systems. Examples of com-
plex software include trading systems, on-line gaming, or Facebook. However,
it is worthwhile to point out that most software has a hybrid nature, being
simple [complicated] in some aspects, and having complex characteristics at
the same time. The categorization is not absolute but based on the main
nature of the software.
110
Robocode
Robocode is a programming game where the goal is to code a software robot
to compete against other robots in a virtual battlefield. The player, who pro-
grams the robot, will have no direct influence on the outcomes during the
game (enacted on the virtual battlefield). Instead, the player must program
the Artificial Intelligence (AI) of the robot, telling it how to behave and react
on events occurring on the battlefield. Battles take place between robots in a
battlefield, where small autonomous robots fight it out until only one is left.
Robots simulate virtual battle tanks with three components: a gun, a radar
and the body. Each of the components can be programmed individually. The
gun can be used to aim and fire at targets; the radar can scan and detect
enemy robots, and the body is used to steer and move around the battlefield.
Robocode was originally started by Matthew A. Nelson as a personal endeav-
our in late 2000 and became a professional competition when he brought it to
IBM in July 2001. Robocode started as an educational tool to aid in learning
Java programming. It has since evolved into something of a phenomenon, as
the prospect of creating simple to complex virtual tanks appears to pose an
attractive challenge to both novice and expert programmers alike. The Ag-
ile community has also used Robocode as an educational tool to demonstrate
Agile practices and values to developers who want to learn Agile methodology.
Figure 5-5: A standard Robocode robot with three components
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5.4.2 Design of experiment
We organized a Robocode competition consisting of two sessions. In the first
session, the teams are required to produce a robot with pre-defined simple
[complicated] requirements. The second session is an open battle that requires
the robot to battle each other until a lone survivor emerges as the winner. The
requirement for the first session produces simple [complicated] software code
whilst the second session produces complex software code.
The Singapore branch of an investment bank was promoting Agile Methodol-
ogy in their developer community, and agreed to host the Robocode competi-
tion to showcase and reinforce knowledge and understanding of Agile practices
to the teams. The competition was open to all the technology staff in the Singa-
pore branch office and participants were required to complete a tutorial on-line
to familiarize themselves with the Robocode API before the competition.
A total of 32 staff members from different lines of business working in the tech-
nology departments registered for the competition. Due to conflicts with work
commitments, 5 staff were unable to attend and 27 developers participated in
the competition. The competition was organized with the following rules:
1. Eight teams were formed, each consisting of 3 or 4 developers. The teams
are formed randomly from the pool of participants. The team decides
how they want to organize the team structure on the go.
2. Each team will be provided with a client from the business department
(role player) who will give requirements for both sessions 1 and 2. The
requirement for session 1 is predefined but the requirement for session 2
is dynamic based on the client’s assessment of the battle situation.
3. There will be 3 sprint exercises for each session, with each sprint con-
sisting of 20 minutes of coding time.
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4. Selected Agile practices are followed. At the beginning of each sprint,
the client will give his team his requirements, and at the end of each
sprint the team needs to give the client a 5-minute demonstration and












Movement Move forward and turn back when you hit an obstruction.
If the obstruction is an enemy robot, turn right instead of
turn back to avoid being attacked.
Sprint 3
Gun If an enemy robot is detected by the radar, point the gun
to its direction and fire.
Radar Rotate the radar every 5 seconds clockwise. If an enemy
robot is detected, perform scan towards -90 to 90 degree of
the enemy robot.
Session 2
Robot Win the battle.
Table 5.2: Requirements for Agile teams
5.4.3 Breakdown of software development activities
We broke down the software development process into five activity sets: re-
quirements gathering, scheduling and prioritizing, coding, integration and test-
ing. The participants were asked to categorize the situation in a session as be-










Movement Move forward and turn back when you hit an obstruction.
If the obstruction is an enemy robot, turn right instead of
turn back to avoid being attacked.
Gun If an enemy robot is detected by the radar, point the gun
in its direction and fire.
Radar Rotate the radar every 5 seconds clockwise. If an enemy
robot is detected, perform a scan from -90 to 90 degree in
the direction of the enemy robot.
Session 2
Robot Win the battle.
Table 5.3: Requirements for non-Agile teams
on the Cynefin framework. This was done after each session. Figures 5-6
and 5-7 show the percentage of participants who viewed the coding activity as
being in a particular category.
Interpreting the results of the exercises led to the conclusion that the require-
ment to produce more complex software leads to more activities falling into
the category of the complex domain to support the development. We prob-
ably cannot conclude absolutely that any software development situation is
complex, simple or complicated; however, it does seem that the situation in
session 2 is a more complex than session 1.
Survey
We conducted a survey consisting of four simple questions after the competi-
tion. The survey was completed by both developers and clients. The survey
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Figure 5-6: Perception of software development activities in session 1
Figure 5-7: Perception of software development activities in session 2
results show that 51% of the participants believed that the Agile methodology
works well in a more complex software development environment while only
29% of the participants believed the Agile methodology works well in a less
complex software development environment. Only 23% of the participants
thought that trust is an important factor in the less complex environment,
while 40% of the participants recognized the value of trust in a more complex
software development environment.
5.4.4 Interviews
After the competition, interviews were conducted with the persons playing the
role of clients, as well as team members from the participating teams. Two
key questions are asked as follows.
115
No. Question
1 Is Agile methodology an effective approach
in session 1?
2 Is Agile methodology an effective approach
in session 2?
3 Do you think that the trust between you and
your team members is an important factor to
develop the software efficiently in session 1?
4 Do you think that the trust between you and
your team members is an important factor to
develop the software efficiently in session 2?
Table 5.4: Survey questions
Question Yes No Not sure
1 10 16 9
2 18 8 7
3 8 12 15
4 14 9 12
Table 5.5: Survey Results
1. What do you think about the robot before it goes into the battle with
other robots?
2. How was that opinion developed? Is it just a feeling or is it based on
some evidence?
When asked what they thought about the robots before they go into the bat-
tle, clients of the Agile teams showed a high level of trust in their robots as
compared to their non-Agile counterparts. They used the word ”confident”,
”expect”, ”should win” to describe their evaluations. Even for the Agile team
that was ranked only 5th, the client considered it as ”unlucky” not to win the
competition. In comparison, clients of the non-Agile team showed a relatively
low level of trust in their robots. They used ”not certain”, ”hard to tell” or
a hesitant ”no” to describe their level of trust. Even for the best-performing
non-Agile robots, winning was a ”surprise” to the client. When asked about
the reason for their opinions, clients of Agile teams attributed it to the fact
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that they had been deeply engaged with the team throughout the entire devel-
opment cycle.For clients of the non-Agile teams, they had limited involvement
in the robot development, and only saw the robots during the demonstration.
”I was very confident that we could win the battle actually. It’s a pity that
we ended up as runner-up. The guys were really doing a good job. They
understood me well. They are able to make quick changes when I see a problem
and highlight to them.” - Client of Agile Team 1
”It’s a bit disappointing, as compared to the efforts the guys have put in. I
think we deserve a top three ranking. Maybe we should do this again! The
team is superb. They collaborated well among themselves.” - Client of Agile
team 2
”Honestly, I have expected that we would do well in the battle, but it is a
great feeling to actually win it! It’s a good job done by the team and I am
extremely happy for them. The have demonstrated good programming skill as
well as good ability to understand the requirement. They are also innovative
and take the initiative to develop a movement algorithm that I did not think
of at the beginning. So credits to all of them!” - Client of Agile Team 3
”I thought we should win! We were just unlucky. Our robot was cornered
when the battle started and that’s really unfortunate for us. But other than
that, I think our robot is indeed very powerful and if more time is given, I am
sure the team will win.” - Client of Agile Team 4
”Erm...honestly not. When they demonstrated to me, I think there were a few
features missing. I am not sure if they misunderstood me or they just could
not deliver to the requirements. Perhaps time is an issue. I did not see how
the team works together, so I am not sure if that might be an issue as well.” -
Client of Non-Agile Team 1
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”Hard to tell. They have given a demonstration, but I don’t know exactly
what other robots are capable of.” - Client of Non-Agile Team 2
”It’s a surprise! I am happy for them. I did not know exactly what our
robot could do at that time, because there was only limited time for them to
demonstrate to me. But it seems they have done a good job.” - Client of
Non-Agile Team 3
”I was not certain whether our robot was ready for the battle. The team
seems to be rushing even at very last minute.” - Client of Non-Agile Team 4
The team members were asked the same question. While not all the team
members felt the same way, the Agile team members as a whole showed a high
level of trust in the robots they have developed. They attributed their high
level of trust to the discussions they had with their clients all the time, and
they were certain they had addressed the problems that had occurred along the
way. For non-Agile team members, they remain conservative because they are
not certain whether they have delivered what the clients wanted and whether
their robots are free of technical glitches because they don’t really have the
chance to test the robot.
”I was very sure we could do well. If not the winner, at least we would be
among the top three. I am glad we ended up as runner-up! I think if we run
the battle again, we may be the winner this time!” - Member of Agile Team 1
”I thought we would win. We were eager to get the battle started.” - Member
of Agile Team 2
”I expected it! I knew we would win it.” - Member of Agile team 3
”We were confused what the client really wants and we did not have the chance
to clarify with him.” - Member of non-Agile team 1
118
”It’s disappointing! I really hope that the requirement by the client can be
clearer!” - Member of non-Agile team 3
”We spent too much time to develop the entire set of features and we did not
prioritize properly.” - Member of non-Agile team 4
5.4.5 Findings
We proposed two hypotheses in this research and the experiment validated
both hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: a more complex software demands a more complex software
development environment, while a simple and complicated software needs only
a simple and complicated software development environment.
The software development activities-allocation exercise based on the Cynefin
framework shows that as the software to be produced gets more complex,
the environment needed to support the development process becomes more
complex as well, because more activities fall into the category of complex
and fewer are seen as being simple [complicated]. We conclude that software
development might be a complex, simple or a complicated endeavour based on
the main categorization of the activities. This is very much dependent on the
characteristics of the software that is being created. However, it is worthwhile
to point out that the software to be produced is not the only factor to determine
the nature of the development process. The organizational structure, culture
and the technology of development may also play a part but these were not
studied as part of this research.
Hypothesis 2: Agile methodology works better in a complex software develop-
ment environment than in a simple [complicated] one as it is able to create a
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high-trust environment to manage the unpredictability.
Our survey showed that more participants believed that Agile methodology is
an effective approach in the more complex environment than a less complex
environment. The survey also showed that more participants recognized the
value of trust in the more complex software development environment. There
might be other factors determining what software development methods are
suitable for a specific situation, such as the organization structure, culture and
the technology used. However, in general, the Agile methodology is more suit-
able to be adopted for complex software development than traditional software
development methods as it creates a high level of trust between the team and
the product owner as well as among the developers themselves. The reason is
that if we regard the software development process as a social complex system,
trust that is created by practices espoused in the Agile methodology can be
used to resolve uncertainties or unpredictability quickly as they develop. Tra-
ditional software development methods are more effective to develop simple
and complicated software but they are less effective to address the uncertain-
ties and unpredictability.
We also acknowledge that Agile methodology is not superior to traditional
software development methods - each has its own area of applicability. The
growing popularity of Agile methodology in the software development space
may reflect the growing level of complexity in software. While it is more
appropriate to use Agile methodology to develop complex software, the tradi-




The Agile methodology has grown in popularity in the developer community
during the past decade, and many research studies have offered various expla-
nations as to why it is a better approach. Most of this research focuses on the
benefits of the Agile methodology; however, there is the potential that this
may be taken as a claim that it is a one-size-fit-all solution. We disagree with
this view and believe that the Agile methodology has its own niche area, just
like traditional methods. However, as more software projects take on complex
characteristics, the Agile methodology is the right tool to address complex-
ity while traditional methods are less effective in dealing with this aspect of
software projects. One of the reasons that the Agile methodology is able to ad-
dress complexity is the role of trust in the software development process. Trust
acts as a reductor of the social complexity and the Agile methodology creates
trust through its practices. These practices cultivate trust-building behaviours
in the team, and these trust-building behaviours in turn build and foster the
trust that is crucial for the software development effort. The Agile practices,
represented by daily stand-up, the retrospective and the iteration planning,
cultivate the team behaviours of ”constant feedback, update and validation
of results”, ”self-managing team with fully committed team members” and
”open and honest communication”. To further understand why these three
behaviours build trust among the team members and with the product owner,
we make use of the trust topologies that are discussed previously.
The behaviour of ”constant feedback, updating and validation of results” re-
veals the real competence or ability of an individual and adjusts the expecta-
tion of other people about him. If the result is not validated often, people may
develop false expectations about an individual that he is unable to fulfil. This
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Figure 5-8: Trust topologies and trust-building behaviors
damages trust and in some cases creates distrust. If the result is validated
frequently, the competence or ability of an individual is clearly known and the
expectation will be more realistic. This promotes trust in a self-organizing and
organic way.
The behaviour of open and honest communication tells the other party what an
individual’s intentions are. It helps to gain the trust of the others as it allows
the individual to demonstrate to the team that whatever he has communicated
is reliable and truthful and his actions will be predictable and logical. This also
builds trust as he will be seen as a man with integrity. The behaviour of being
self-managing and fully-committed shows that individuals within the team are
working towards a common goal whole-heartedly. In such an environment,
individuals feel like being part of a family where goodwill and affection are
naturally developed.
The behaviour of being self-managing and fully-committed shows that individ-
uals within the team are working towards a common goal whole-heartedly. In
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such an environment, individuals feel like being part of a family where goodwill
and affection are naturally developed.
To summarize, the Agile practices cultivate trust-building behaviours via the
trust constructors postulated in published trust topologies. The behaviour of
”constant feedback, update and validation of results” reveals one’s true ability
and competence, and enables other people to calculate what you can deliver.
Open and honest communication tells others about your level of integrity and it
makes it easier for them to predict your actions. You are obligated to perform
what you have communicated and this forms a loose contract between you and
others. Self-managing and fully-committed behaviour of individuals grows the
goodwill, benevolence and affection among the team members, which builds
trust like in a family.
Trust and effective communication is closely related. Most of the previous
research on trust has focused on the role of effective communication to build
trust. On the other hand, trust also forms the foundation for effective commu-
nication between team members, and with the product owner. Without trust,
product owners are suspicious of the team’s capability and the team members
are suspicious of the product owner’s intentions. Trust is the cornerstone of a
successful relationship between an Agile team and the product owner. When
the Agile team trusts that the product owner is telling them the real require-
ments, with no intention to exploit the team, they are more willing to give an
accurate estimate and commit to the plan. When the product owner trusts the
team, he is more willing to provide an requirement list that matches his needs,
knowing that the team will perform to the best of their ability. When the prod-
uct owner can effectively communicate his requirements to the Agile team and
the Agile team can effectively set the expectation of the product owner about
their competence, the productivity of the team is increased because the team
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doesn’t waste their resources on requirements that are not really wanted by
the product owner. With trust, the product owner implements less monitoring
and controlling mechanisms, hence reducing the amount of time and resources
spent on such processes by the Agile team. Effective communication about
the requirements also improves the quality of the final product because the
Agile team understands what the product owner really wants and the product
owner also knows that the team is capable of achieving it. The product owner
is more satisfied with the outcome produced by the Agile team as a result.
Trust within the Agile team also facilitates collaboration among team mem-
bers. Trust embodies an expectation that those we work with will not take
advantage of us or exploit a situation to benefit one at the expense of oth-
ers. When trust is low, we usually build formal protections into relationships;
conversely, when trust is high, we are more likely to develop informal but well-
understood ways of working together. Social context often demands a formal
framework for collaboration. Collaboration succeeds when trust is active and
trust is embedded in the process. Without trust, collaboration falls apart
quickly, sometimes, irreparably. Collaboration among team members boosts
the productivity of the team as a whole. They are able to leverage on each
other’s strengths. Collaboration allows team members to draw upon a collec-
tive knowledge base and skill set of the members, which would otherwise be
inaccessible. More importantly, collaboration helps to form new relationships,
establish new audiences, and in many cases, substantially improve the final
product. As a result, collaboration enables the team to deliver a result that
satisfies the product owner.
With effective communication and close collaboration among team members,
the overall team performance is improved. This results in a positive impact
on the project and its resultant product. Higher team performance improves
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the quality of the resultant product. As a recent study shows (Kendall et al,
2010), team performance is positively associated with the information, system






This thesis has studied the trust relationship in financial services information
systems and proposed a complex systems approach to effectively and efficiently
manage the trust of the users towards these systems. It complements the
literature in this area and it is also one of the initial studies that apply the
Cynefin framework to develop an approach to manage trust in financial services
information systems. The entire research consists of three phases and the
specific contributions from each phase are detailed in the next three sections.
6.1.1 Managing Trust from Quality Attributes
In the first phase of the research, we focus on the trustworthiness of the finan-
cial services information systems because trustworthiness is the foundation of
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the trust. Among various constituents of trustworthiness, quality is the most
important one. Quality reflects the trustworthiness of the financial services
information systems and instils the trust of the customer in the system. Our
research concludes that the trust in financial services information systems is
impacted by quality attributes, such as performance, availability, reliability,
usability, functionality, security, etc. We also prioritize these qualities in the
order of their impact on trust so as to serve as a guide for the developers to de-
sign and build the systems where the trust is an explicit goal. The significant
quality attributes that fosters the trust should be induced in the systems right
from the design stage to implementation as this would result in trustworthy
financial services information systems.
The research result in this phase suggests to the management and policy-
makers that trust in the financial services information systems is directly im-
pacted by quality attributes of the system. In order to gain trust from the
users, the developer of the system needs to focus on the quality attributes of
the system. However, not all the quality attributes have the equal impact to
the users’ perceived trustworthiness of the system. The usability, functionality
and reliability are the most important quality attributes that the system de-
velopers need to focus to manage user’s trust in financial services information
systems.
6.1.2 Managing Trust in Engineering Systems
In the second phase of the research, we look at the financial services infor-
mation systems as engineering systems that involve a lot of human factors.
A model to manage trust in engineering systems is proposed, which is based
on expectation, risk and complexity. Clearly, the function of trust as a re-
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ductor of complexity in the engineering system suggests that human being’s
trust would be of great value to the designers of engineering systems in gen-
eral. The research has focused on human trust in engineering systems. It has
only touched upon the factors that affect trust: the expectation generalized
from experience, risk exposure and the complexity perceived. As trust is a
complicated issue, it is subjective and there may be other factors which will
impact on trust. However, regardless of this, we believe the recommendations
developed from the model will provide informed decisions on the design and
operation of engineering systems so that it leads to higher trust in systems.
The research result in this phase suggests to the management and policy-
makers that trust in the financial services information systems is also impacted
by human factors, such as the expectation generalized from experience, risk
exposure and the complexity perceived. Hence, in addition to focus on the
quality attributes of the system, it is also important to manage user’s ex-
pectation, reduce the risk exposure associated with the system and resolve
perceived complexity in order to manage user’s trust in financial services in-
formation systems..
6.1.3 Managing Trust in Complex Systems
In the final phase of the research, we looked at the financial services informa-
tion systems as complex systems. Complex systems require a totally different
approach to managing the trust as the relationship between cause and effect
can only be perceived in retrospect, and results of interventions and actions are
often unpredictable. The good or best practices that we have recommended as
a result of the first and second phases of the research do not work effectively
and efficiently in the complex systems domain. We apply the Cynefin frame-
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work to make sense of the different financial services information systems and
approach them differently according to their system properties. While not
all financial services information systems should be categorized as complex
systems, an increasing number of them are evolving to becoming complex sys-
tems. For these, we also developed an approach to manage users trust towards
them.
The research result in this phase suggests to the management and policy-
makers that as trust is a complex issue and financial services information
systems are increasingly complex, it requires a different development method-
ology and approach to manage trust effectively. It is still important to focus on
quality attributes and human factors of trust; however, the approach to man-
age trust in financial services information systems need to be able to respond
to the complex situations that the financial services information systems are
operating in. The Cynefin frameworks provides an effective general approach,
and the Agile methodology showcases several practices that is effective to man-
age user’s trust in financial services information systems.
6.2 Research Limitations
As is the case with any research, readers need to consider the contributions
presented and discussed in this thesis in the context of the limitations un-
der which the research was conducted. Whilst the research has posed and
attempted to answer several interesting questions with respect to trust and
engineering systems, the process typically generates more questions that need
to be explored through further research.
Most importantly with respect to the current research, readers need to remem-
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ber that the research is carried out mainly in the Asian setting, particularly
that of Singapore a cosmopolitan, globally connected city-state that has very
good technical infrastructure, a well-educated and technically proficient work-
force drawn from diverse cultures, and technically savvy consumers of products
and services. The participants of our surveys, interviews and experiment may
have originally come from different countries, but most of them are currently
working in Singapore and their cultures and views have been influenced by
the Singapore setting. The extent to which our findings can be generalized
certainly requires further investigation.
It is also worthy to note that the proposed approach to manage trust in fi-
nancial services information systems is verified in a small-scale controlled en-
vironment and not in big-scale real projects. Its applicability in real situations
need to be tested and validated. Further research is needed to shed more light
in this direction.
6.3 Potential Future Research
The potential areas of future research and investigation are described below.
6.3.1 Working in a Distributed Team Environment
The complex systems approach to manage trust in financial services informa-
tion systems require the development team to work closely with the users.
This requires a high level of communication and close collaboration between
the user community and the development team, thus requiring the two parties
to be co-located (ideally). Co-location is important because it maximizes the
ability to communicate in person with one another. The best communication
130
is face-to-face, with communications occurring through facial expression, body
language, intonation and words.
However, off-shore software development with distributed teams is a norm in
big organizations, such as major financial institutions. It is quite common
that the development team is located in a location that has no easy access to
the user community. For example, the development may be located in India
while the user community is mainly located in North America and Europe.
The communication, which is a significant part of the efforts to manage trust,
is challenged by geographic remoteness as well as different time-zone.
How to overcome the challenge of distributed team environment being able to
communicate and collaborate effectively and efficiently is the key in managing
trust for the financial services information systems in this context. While there
have been researches and studies in this area, there is more work to be done.
6.3.2 Internationalization and Culture and Language
barriers
A lot of financial services information systems serve users globally, with dif-
ferent culture backgrounds and languages. Communication between people
with different cultures and languages can be challenging. Culture background
is a major factor to determining the trust propensity of individuals in a so-
ciety. A culture represents a particular way of thinking, seeing, hearing and
interpreting things around us. Thus, words or sentences can be interpreted
in different ways. With translation, the chances of mistakes increase as no
language can faithfully translate all the nuances and implications while keep-
ing intact the essence of the original words. According to Kim and Mattila
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(2011), the obstacle of language barriers is particularly critical during inter-
cultural service encounters where the customer and the service provider are
from different cultures. For example, the reality that most service suppliers in
the U.S. only speak English may greatly affect international customers. Cus-
tomers may find it difficult to communicate or even get necessary information
regarding products or services, thus resulting in low trust of the system.
There has been extensive research in this area, under the term of ”Interna-
tionalization and localization”, frequently abbreviated to the numeronym i18n
(where 18 stands for the number of letters between the first i and last n in in-
ternationalization, a usage coined at DEC in the 1970s or 80s). However, they
have focused on making the system world-ready, that is to make a product
usable with multiple scripts and cultures (globalization) and separating user
interface resources in a localizable format. The current prevailing practice
is for applications to place text in resource strings which are loaded during
program execution when needed. These strings, stored in resource files, are
relatively easy to translate. Programs are often built to reference resource
libraries depending on the selected locale data.
While those practices may have made the systems usable, they are not effective
in managing the trust relationship between the global users and the systems,
which are usually developed towards a group of users in a single location.
6.4 Final Remarks
In this research, we have developed several models along the way to understand
the trust issue in financial services information systems. While they all have
some value to deepen our understanding about the trust issue and are validated
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in one way or another, none of them are able to address all the trust issues for
all the scenarios. It has been said that, All models are wrong, some models
are useful (Box & Draper, 1987). From my research experience, I would say,
”All models are right, some models are more applicable.”
What does our model tell us? Here are some of the conclusions we can draw
from the research:
• The evolution of software development since 1940s has been a process of
continuing search, trial and error, deduction and induction, figuring out
what works, what works better, and what doesn’t work very well at all.
• The majority of available software development methods and tools have
been designed to succeed in simple and complicated domains. It wasnt
intended this way, but the failure to identify and understand the un-
derlying assumptions about these methods made it inevitable. Without
extraordinary efforts, their effectiveness begins to deteriorate the further
one gets into the complex domain.
• Information systems may operate in simple, complicated, complex or
even chaotic environment. Software development team needs to choose
the methodology to develop them accordingly.
Without a sense-making framework such as Cynefin, decisions about which
software development methodology to use in building a particular information
system become a one-size-for-all proposition. In many software development
organizations, the software development team never changes its development
methodology to suit the information system that is being built. Factors that
are instrumental to success, such as team performance, requirement engineer-
ing or project management are often taken for granted or neglected. But with
an effective foundational understanding of which domain a particular infor-
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mation system resides in, the choice of appropriate methodology, and a focus
of effort on the success factors, can dramatically enhance the probability of
success in the software development process.
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Survey on Trust and Quality
Attributes
A.1 Survey Research Method
Survey is the main research method we use for our study on trust relationship
with quality attributes. Survey research involves the collection of information
from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. It is an
efficient method for systematically collecting data from a broad spectrum of
individuals and educational settings. A great many researchers choose this
method of data collection. In fact, surveys have become such a vital part of
our social fabric that we cannot assess much of what we read in the newspaper
or see on TV without having some understanding of survey research.
Survey research owes its continuing popularity to its versatility, efficiency, and
generalizability. First and foremost is the versatility of survey methods. Re-
searchers have used survey methods to investigate areas of research as diverse
as marketing, team organization, political policy, and leadership. Although a
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survey is not the ideal method for learning about every process, a well-designed
survey can enhance our understanding of just about any issue.
A survey should be guided by a clear conception of the research problem under
investigation and the population to be sampled. Throughout the process of
questionnaire design, the research objective should be the primary basis for
making decisions about what to include and exclude and what to emphasize or
treat in a cursory fashion. The questionnaire should be viewed as an integrated
whole, in which each section and every question serve a clear purpose related
to the study’s objective and each section complements other sections.
A survey can be conducted in multiple ways, such as in-person surveys, phone-
surveys, group-administrated surveys and on-line surveys. In our research, on-
line surveys are used. On-line surveys are stored on a server that is controlled
by the researcher. Respondents are then asked to visit the website (often by
just clicking an e-mailed link) and respond to the questionnaire by checking
answers.
A.2 Survey Design
We design an on-line survey for our study on trust relationship with quality
attributes. The survey was conducted on the platform of Kwik Surveys, which
is a free web-based application that allows researchers to create their own
surveys and share them across a wide array of sites and services.
The first part of the survey collects respondents’ opinion of their trust (T) of
a particular financial services information system of their own choice, and the
reputation (R), experience (E) and communication (C) of the financial services
information system respectively. For each variable, the respondent’s opinion
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is assessed by multiple questions, each carrying a value ranging between 1
(lowest) and 5 (highest). The final score of the respondent’s opinion on any
variable is an average score of these questions.
The second part of the survey collects respondents’ opinion of whether they
think the trust in financial services information systems is related to any of the
quality attributes: performance, usability, reliability, availability, security and
function? As we intend to use Intuitionistics Fuzzy Sets to analyse the data,
the questions have been designed in a straight-forward manner; however, the
respondents have the option to choose the ”Not Sure” option if they are not
certain about the relationship between trust and a particular quality attribute.
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Trust In Financial Services Information Systems
Financial Services Information System(s) (FSIS ) refers to information systems used by a
broad range of financial organizations that provide financial services. These organizations
include banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, consumer finance companies,
stock brokerages, investment funds, and some government sponsored regulatory
enterprises. Typical examples of FSIS are the network of Automated Teller Machines
(ATMs), online retailer brokerage systems, Foreign Exchange (FOREX) trading systems,
risk management systems in the banks etc. 
In this survey, we will collect the data to analyze the trust relationship between the FSIS
and the end users. 
Thank you for your participation. 
As a token of appreciation, we have prepared 5 movie voucher to be given away to
the lucky participants.
What's your email address?



















On a scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high), to what extent to you think of your general financial
knowledge?
 A consumer.
 Casual investor, buying unit trust, foreign exchange etc.
 A professional trader, an active investor.
On a scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high), to what extent to you think of your general IT skill?
 A casual user, surfing net, email,
 An application user, who needs to operate in an IT environment, but not necessary to understand how it works.
 An IT professional
Before we proceed to more questions, please choose an FSIS that you interact most.
All the following questions should be answered against this particular system that
you interact with. For example: DBS ATM, UOB Online Banking, Giro.















What's the biggest amount that you can transact on the FSIS comfortably?
 Below 3K
 Between 3K to 10K
 Between 10 to 30K
 Between 30K 10 100K
 Above 100K
When a new feature is added to the system, what's your confidence level that the new




 See how it goes
 Not confident that it will work






How do you think of the organization that the FSIS belongs to?
 Very good  Good  Average  Poor  Bad
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 Never heard of it































Do you think that the system provides good documentation or online help page to














Are you informed of the new features and functions in advance?
 Always










Please describe an event that builds or improves your trust in the system. Please
explain why such an event could improve the trust. (Optional)
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Please describe an incident that you think your trust with the systme is most
damaged. Please explain why the incident damanged the trust and what would you
advise to the system's deleopers? (Optional)
The reputation of the system will be improved if the following quality attributes are
improved.







The experience with the system will be improved if the following quality attribues are
improved.








Thank you for your participation. You may close the window now.
Survey generated by KwikSurveys.com free online surveys
The communication with the system will be improved if the following quality attributes
are improved.









Respondent Trust Reputation Experience Communication
1 2.6 3.5 4 4
2 1.8 3.5 3.25 3.5
3 2.4 3 3 3
4 2.2 3.75 4 3.75
5 2.4 3 3 3.25
6 3 4.75 4 3.5
7 2.2 4 4 3.25
8 3.8 4 4.25 3.5
9 2.8 3.25 4.25 4
10 3.2 4.25 4.5 3.5
11 3.6 4.5 4 4.67
12 3.4 4.75 4 4
13 2.4 4 3 3.67
14 2.6 3.75 3.5 4.33
15 3.2 3.75 4 3.67
16 3 4.5 3.75 4.67
17 2.6 4.25 4 3.67
18 2.2 3 3.5 3.67
19 2.4 3.75 3.5 4
20 3.4 4.25 4.5 4.33
21 3 4.5 4 4
22 3.2 3.75 4.5 4.33
23 2.8 3.5 4.25 3.67
24 3.8 4.25 4 4.33
25 4 3.75 4.75 3.67
26 2.4 3.5 3.75 3.67
27 2.8 3.75 3.5 3.33
28 3.8 4.25 4.5 4
29 2.4 4 3 3
30 3 4.25 4.5 3.67
31 2.8 3.75 4 3.67
32 2.6 3.25 4.25 4.33
33 3.2 3.75 4 4.67
34 3.6 4 3.75 4.33
35 3.8 4.25 4.5 4.67
36 3.6 4.75 4.25 4.33
37 3 4.5 4 3.67
38 2.8 4.5 3.75 3.33
39 3.4 3.75 4.5 4.67
40 2.6 4.25 4.25 3.33
41 2.2 4.25 3.5 3
42 2.6 2.75 3.5 3.33
43 3.6 3.75 4 4.33
44 2.8 4 3.5 4
45 2.6 3.75 3.75 2.67
46 2.8 3.2 4 3.33
47 3 4.5 3.75 4.33
48 3.4 5 4.25 4
49 2.8 4.5 4.25 4.33
50 2.4 4 3.75 3.33








1 Below 20 M Student low medium
2 40-49 F Others medium low
3 30-39 F Manufacturing low low
4 40-49 M Education/Law/Arts medium medium
5 50-59 F IT low high
6 40-49 M Government/Public Sector medium low
7 20-29 M Others medium high
8 40-49 F Manufacturing low low
9 20-29 M Education/Law/Arts medium medium
10 20-29 F IT low high
11 50-59 M Manufacturing low low
12 20-29 F Education/Law/Arts medium medium
13 40-49 F Banking/Finance/Accounting high low
14 20-29 M Banking/Finance/Accounting high high
15 Below 20 M Student low high
16 20-29 F Education/Law/Arts medium medium
17 50-59 M Government/Public Sector medium low
18 20-29 F Banking/Finance/Accounting high medium
19 20-29 M Manufacturing low medium
20 20-29 M IT medium high
21 30-39 M Banking/Finance/Accounting high high
22 30-39 M IT medium high
23 20-29 M Banking/Finance/Accounting high medium
24 50-59 F Education/Law/Arts low low
25 40-49 M Government/Public Sector low medium
26 30-39 F Education/Law/Arts medium medium
27 40-49 M Education/Law/Arts medium low
28 30-39 F IT low high
29 20-29 F Manufacturing low medium
30 40-49 M Government/Public Sector high medium
31 30-39 F IT low high
32 30-39 M IT high high
33 20-29 M Banking/Finance/Accounting high medium
34 30-39 F IT medium high
35 Below 20 M Student low medium
36 20-29 F Education/Law/Arts low medium
37 40-49 M IT low high
38 40-49 F Manufacturing medium low
39 20-29 F Student medium medium
40 20-29 M Education/Law/Arts low medium
41 30-39 F Government/Public Sector medium low
42 50-59 M Banking/Finance/Accounting high low
43 30-39 F IT low high
44 40-49 F Education/Law /Arts low low
45 50-59 M Others medium medium
46 20-29 M IT medium high
47 30-39 F IT medium high
48 20-29 F Education/Law/Arts low low
49 20-29 M Student medium medium
50 30-39 M Government/Public Sector low medium




Robocode is a programming game where the goal is to code a robot to com-
pete against other robots in a battlefield. The player, who programmed the
robot, will have no direct influence during the game. Instead, the player must
program the Artificial Intelligence (AI) of the robot telling it how to behave
and react on events occurring in the battlefield. Robocode’s battles take place
in a battlefield, where small automated robots fight it out until only one is left
(see Figure C-1). Robots are like virtual tanks with three components (see
Figure C-2): a gun, a radar and the body. Each of the components can be
programmed individually. The gun can be used to aim and fire; the radar can
scan and detect the enemy robots and the body can be used to steer and move
the robot.
Robocode was originally started by Matthew A. Nelson as a personal endeav-
our in late 2000 and became a professional one when he brought it into IBM,
in the form of an AlphaWorks download, in July 2001. In the beginning of
2005, Robocode was brought to SourceForge as Open Source with Robocode
version 1.0.7. Since then, the Robocode community began to develop their
own versions of Robocode in order to get rid of bugs and put new features
into Robocode, the Contributions for Open Source Robocode and later on the
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Figure B-1: Robocode robots fighting each other in the battlefield
Figure B-2: A standard Robocode robot with three components
RobocodeNG project by Flemming N. Larsen.
The Singapore branch of an investment bank was promoting Agile Methodol-
ogy in their developer community and they decided to organize a Robocode
competition to showcase and reinforce the knowledge and understanding of Ag-
ile practices of the teams. However, instead of building the strongest robots
and competing with each other, the teams were provided with a real world
scenario of gathering the requirements from the client and delivering accord-
ingly.
Our experiment is built on this competition, but the research is conducted in-
dependently. The participants were not informed about the focus on the trust,
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and the competition result is not influenced by the experiment. After the com-
petition, we conducted surveys and interviews and gathered the feedback from
the role-playing clients and representatives of each team to share their opin-
ions and direct observations of the events happened during the competition,
which helps us to understand the trust issue in the context.
In total, 8 teams participated in this competition, each consisting of 4 team
members. The organizer sent out the competition invitation to all the tech-
nology staff in Singapore branch and participants were required to complete
a tutorial on-line to familiarize themselves with the Robocode API before the
competition. The teams were organized by the following rules:
1. Each team consists of 4 members. The team decides how they want to
organize the team structure and split the roles & responsibilities.
2. Each team will be provided with a client (a role player) who will give
requirements.
3. The team does not know in advance whether they will be using Agile
methodology or traditional methodology. The client will inform when
the competition starts.
Eight senior executives are invited to role-played the clients. For clients of
Agile team, they are advised to play a more active role. They need to sit with
the development team and make themselves available all the time if the team
seeks clarification or feedback. For clients of non-Agile team, they are advised
to sit remotely and discuss the requirements only during the beginning of each
session.
B.1 Schedule
In this competition, there are totally 8 teams and each team is assigned to
a client, played by senior executives from the developer community. Half of
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the teams adopt the Agile methodology , while the other teams will be using
the traditional methodology. For Agile teams, each session will be split into
3 sprints respectively. In the first session, the teams are required to produce
a robot with pre-defined requirements. The second session is an open battle
that requires the robot to battle each other until a lone survivor emerges as
the winner.
Teams have 90 minutes for each session. For Agile teams, they have 30 minutes
for each sprint, which includes requirement gathering (5 minutes), development
(15 minutes), demonstration (5 minutes) and retrospective meeting with the
client (5 minutes). For non-Agile teams, they have the flexibility to allocate
their 90 minutes among requirement gathering, development and demonstra-
tion. However, once the requirement is gathered and clarified, they are not
allowed to go back to the client for further clarification.
B.2 Requirements
The requirements are given to the clients only. The teams need to gather
the requirements from the client at the beginning of each session. While the
requirements of session 1 is split into 3 sprints, they are given to the non-Agile
team as one single requirement set. The requirement for session 2 is to win the
battle, which is for the client to interpret further. The client needs to develop
specific requirements about the robot’s movement, shooting and scanning to
win the battle and pass them on to the development teams.
B.3 Competition Results
The results of the competition is shown in Table B.5. For first session when the
requirements are simple, teams using different methodologies have performed





6:15 - 6:20 PM Requirement gathering with client
6:20 - 6:35 PM Development work
6:35 - 6:40 PM Demonstration to client
6:40 - 6:45 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Sprint 2
6:45 - 6:50 PM Requirement gathering with client
6:50 - 7:05 PM Development work
7:05 - 7:10 PM Demonstration to client
7:10 - 7:15 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Sprint 3
7:15 - 7:20 PM Requirement gathering with client
7:20 - 7:35 PM Development work
7:35 - 7:40 PM Demonstration to client
7:40 - 7:45 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Session 2
Sprint 4
7:45 - 7:50 PM Requirement gathering with client
7:50 - 8:05 PM Development work
8:05 - 8:10 PM Demonstration to client
8:10 - 8:15 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Sprint 5
8:15 - 8:20 PM Requirement gathering with client
8:20 - 8:35 PM Development work
8:35 - 8:40 PM Demonstration to client
8:40 - 8:45 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Sprint 6
8:45 - 8:50 PM Requirement gathering with client
8:50 - 9:05 PM Development work
9:05 - 9:10 PM Demonstration to client
9:10 - 9:15 PM Retrospective meeting with client
Table B.1: Schedule for Agile Teams
all the 8 requirements: two of them are using Agile methodology while the
other two are using non-Agile methodology. For teams that are unable to
implement all of the requirements.
For session 2, the Agile teams are performing better than non-Agile teams.
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Time Activities
6:15 - 7:45 PM Session 1: Requirement gathering, development work &
demonstration
7:45 - 9:15 PM Session 2: Requirement gathering, development work &
demonstration











Movement Move forward and turn back when you hit an obstruction.
If the obstruction is an enemy robot, turn right instead of
turn back to avoid being attacked.
Sprint 3
Gun If an enemy robot is detected by the radar, point the gun
to its direction and fire.
Radar Rotate the radar every 5 seconds clockwise. If an enemy
robot is detected, perform scan towards -90 to 90 degree of
the enemy robot.
Session 2
Robot Win the battle.
Table B.3: Requirements for Agile teams
The highest ranking for non-Agile teams is third and Agile teams occupies 3










Movement Move forward and turn back when you hit an obstruction.
If the obstruction is an enemy robot, turn right instead of
turn back to avoid being attacked.
Gun If an enemy robot is detected by the radar, point the gun
to its direction and fire.
Radar Rotate the radar every 5 seconds clockwise. If an enemy
robot is detected, perform scan towards -90 to 90 degree of
the enemy robot.
Session 2
Robot Win the battle.
Table B.4: Requirements for non-Agile teams
Team Percentage of require-
ments implemented
Battle ranking
Agile Team 1 100% 2
Agile Team 2 87.5% 4
Agile Team 3 100% 1
Agile Team 4 75% 5
Non-Agile Team 1 87.5% 7
Non-Agile Team 2 100% 6
Non-Agile Team 3 100% 3
Non-Agile Team 4 87.5% 8
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